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INTRODUCTION 
Over the next ten to fifteen years, Americans will transfer as much as $12 
trillion dollars to their descendants. 1 The trust mechanism has assumed a central 
role in the transfer of intergenerational wealth and is now a staple in most estate 
plans. The legal term "trust" evokes images of well-managed assets to be used 
fruitfully into the future, with generous but firm support from dependable 
managers and strategists. At the center of this image is the notion of trust itself. 
The settlor seeks a capable and conscientious individual or institution-an 
individual or institution that she trusts-to ensure the steady growth and 
continued availability of significant sums of money.2 And it is this image that 
leads many, both affluent and not, to seek out money managers to create trusts 
for loved ones. Nonetheless, evolving legal doctrine threatens to undermine the 
image of the trust based on trust. 
In steadily increasing numbers, trust scholars are embracing the view that 
fiduciary duties are mere default rules, freely waivable by the parties to the trust 
document. This view parallels the default rule model developed in corporate 
law by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, who have argued that fiduciary 
duties are "contract" terms that shareholders and management would have 
agreed to had they anticipated agency cost problems.3 Management, they argue, 
should be free to modify--0r even eliminate-fiduciary duties in the corporate 
charter.4 
This argument-the subject of vigorous debate amongst corporate scholars5 -
1. V. Gerard Comizio & Jeffrey L. Hare, Regulatory Developments for Banks and Thrifts Conduct-
ing Trust and Fiduciary Activities, 59 Bus. LAW. 1299, 1299 (2004). 
2. The trust divides legal and beneficial title, granting a trustee legal title of the trust assets with 
instructions to manage the assets for the benefit not of the trustee itself, but for the beneficiaries. JOEL C. 
DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 473 (2d ed. 2003). 
3. Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel have argued that fiduciary duties are the 
terms that parties would have chosen to govern the agency relationship if they had thought to bargain to 
reduce agency costs. See FRANK H . EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 8-10, 91-93 (1991). For an application of agency costs theory to trust, see Robert H. 
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 621 (2004). 
4 . See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 90-108; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 425, 427 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty] (stating that " [f]iduciary duties are not special duties ... [a]ctual 
contracts always prevail over implied ones"). 
5. Not all corporate scholars accept the default rule model of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Deborah A. 
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (arguing that 
fiduciary duties have a mandatory core); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition] (arguing 
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has its parallel in trust scholarship. Most notably, John Langbein, drawing on 
the work of Frederic W. Maitland6 and corporate law scholarship,7 argues that 
trustees' fiduciary duties are default rules, generally modifiable by the parties to 
the trust document. 8 Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei also readily accept the 
characterization of trustees' fiduciary duties as freely waivable default terms. 9 
The default rule paradigm has increasingly influenced doctrine and permeates 
the recently promulgated Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"). 10 
Of course, parties to a trust instrument may, to a considerable extent, tailor a 
trustee's fiduciary duties to facilitate the settlor's objectives. But it is a long leap 
from the proposition that fiduciary duties can be tailored to further individual 
objectives to the conclusion that fiduciary duties are merely gap-filling default 
rules, similar to those found in the Uniform Commercial Code's ("U.C.C.") 
Article Two. 11 As even default rule proponents recognize, trustees' fiduciary 
duties are not, and never have been, completely waivable. For example, no 
court would uphold a trust provision purporting to eliminate the trustee's duty 
of loyalty in its entirety. In addition, by statute or common law some states 
invalidate or sharply circumscribe parties' power to eviscerate the trustee's duty 
of care through a clause that exculpates the trustee from liability for ordinary or 
gross negligence. 12 These doctrinal rules are inconsistent with a pure default 
rule paradigm. If legislatures and courts regarded fiduciary duties as pure 
default rules, then both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty would be 
entirely optional, and courts would adjudicate trust disputes like other contract 
disputes: they simply would interpret and enforce contractual provisions, even if 
that the limits of cognition justify the imposition of certain mandatory fiduciary duties); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 
FORDHAM L. REv. 437 (1993) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Divergence of Standards] ; Tamar Frankel, Fidu-
ciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209 (1995) [hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Duties] . 
6. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, l05 YALE L.J. 625, 628, 634 
( 1995) (citing FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES ( 1909)). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45. 
8. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 6, at 629 (stating that "fiduciary duties in trust law are unambigu-
ously contractarian"); id. at 659 (stating that "the duty of loyalty is default law that yields to contrary 
terms of the trust deal"); Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 678 (characterizing as "persuasive" Langbein's 
conclusion that "fiduciary duties imposed by the law of trusts are simply majoritarian default rules"). 
9. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 447-49 (1998) (characterizing rules that govern the 
settlor-beneficiary-trustee relationship as a set of default terms, and emphasizing that fiduciary duties in 
particular are merely default terms). 
IO. The Uniform Trust Code of 2000 (hereinafter "UTC") has been enacted in Kansas (2002), 
Wyoming (2003), Nebraska (2003), New Mexico (2003), the District of Columbia (2004), Utah (2004), 
Maine (2004), Tennessee (2004), New Hampshire (2004), and Missouri (2004). Arizona enacted the 
UTC in 2003 but quickly repealed it in 2004. Twenty other states are currently considering legislation. 
Cf Five Jurisdictions Enact UTC, One Repeals, UTC Norns (Nat' ! Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. 
State Laws), Summer 2004, at I, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/newsletters/UTCNotes/UTCNotes_JuI04_ 
print.pdf. 
11. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 427 (stating that 
"[f]iduciary duties are not special duties .... [a]ctual contracts always prevail over implied ones"). 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 161-88. 
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those provisions waived all fiduciary protections entirely. Scholars have not 
offered an account that explains why trust law differs from contract law in this 
important respect. Moreover, even those scholars who subscribe to the default 
rule paradigm acknowledge that there are-and should be-a few limits on 
parties' ability to waive fiduciary duties. 13 But they have not offered a coherent 
theory to explain that conclusion, or for determining what those limits should 
be. 
This Article argues that characterizing trustees' fiduciary duties as pure 
"default rules" too easily equates trusts with contracts and blinds academics and 
courts to the need to develop a coherent theory about the extent to which 
fiduciary duties can be modified. Any such theory must take into account 
the trust mechanism's unique characteristics. Transplanting Easterbrook and 
Fischel's thesis to the trust context is problematic, because market forces, which 
(arguably) act to discipline corporate fiduciaries, impose no significant con-
straints on trustees. Information asymmetries between trust settlors and profes-
sional trustees make it unlikely that certain types of express waivers incorporated 
in trust documents reflect a settlor's judgment that the provision would be 
value-maximizing. 14 
Finally, labeling fiduciary duties "default rules" threatens to strip fiduciary 
rules of their moral content. Fiduciary duties are most effective when they 
function both as legal rules and moral norms. A label that equates the duty of 
loyalty with, say, a U.C.C. provision allocating risk of loss undermines the 
duty's normative force. The erosion of the social norm may create significant 
external costs for all future settlors and beneficiaries, in two respects. 15 First, 
destigmatizing opportunist behavior may encourage trustees to stretch the bound-
aries of acceptable conduct. Second, erosion of the norm will create uncertainty 
about the content of the fiduciary standard, which will increase transaction costs 
for all settlors. 
These deficiencies in the default rule model are critical, because default-rule 
rhetoric has already influenced the positive law, and now is poised to affect a 
quiet revolution in trust law, most notably with respect to the duty of loyalty. 
13. In trust Jaw, Langbein acknowledges that there are, and should be, outer limits on the extent to 
which a trust document may dispense with fiduciary duties. See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in 
the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1105, llll-17, 1121-25 (2004). He acknowledges the need for a 
narrow mandatory regime to deal with potential trustee fraud, id. at 1124-25, and suggests that policies 
against perpetuating inefficient dead-hand control might justify a court's refusal to enforce a settlor 's 
directive to concentrate trust investments in only one asset (a waiver of the duty to diversify). Id. at 
1111-17. He also suggests that concern for effectuation of the settlors' intent justifies Uniform Trust 
Code provisions that do not allow a settlor to waive the trustee's duty to act in good faith, or to waive 
all of the trustee's fiduciary duties. Id. at 1121-25. In so concluding, Langbein posits that no informed 
settlor would agree to such extreme waivers. Id. at 1124. This Article builds upon this insight, picking 
up where Langbein leaves off to ask whether and to what extent information asymmetries might justify 
courts' treatment of other fiduciary duties as mandatory. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 87-102; 166-70. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 109-15. 
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First, the UTC, which is permeated with default rule rhetoric, 16 authorizes 
exculpatory provisions that insulate trustees from liability for breach of the duty 
of care. Here, the UTC simply purports to reaffirm well-established law. And 
indeed, corporate trustees routinely insert exculpatory clauses into trust docu-
ments, and cases suggesting that exculpatory clauses are enforceable date from 
the tum of the twentieth century. 17 Yet the statement that exculpatory clauses 
are freely enforceable is a misreading of the case law. 18 Moreover, the com-
ments to the UTC provide that an exculpatory provision is conclusively enforce-
able if the settlor was represented by counsel. 19 This is an ill-advised departure 
from common law. Finally, several states have held firm to rules or statutes that 
prohibit institutional trustees from invoking exculpatory clauses to shield them 
from liability for negligence;20 the UTC would change the law in those states. 
Moreover, default rule rhetoric is beginning to erode the normative force of 
16. For example, the Prefatory Note to the UTC states: 
Default Rule: Most of the Uniform Trust Code consists of default rules that apply only if the 
terms of the trust fail to address or insufficiently cover a particular issue. Pursuant to Section 
105, a drafter is free to override a substantial majority of the Code's provisions. The 
exceptions are scheduled in Section 105(b). 
Paragraph 7 of the Prefatory Note states: 
Article 7---0ffice of Trustee-This article contains a series of default rules dealing with the 
office of trustee, all of which may be modified in the terms of the trust. 
The first sentence of The General Comment to Article I states: 
The Uniform Trust Code is primarily a default statute. Most of the Code's provisions can be 
overridden in the terms of the trust. The provisions not subject to override are scheduled in 
Section 105(b). 
Section 105, titled "Default and Mandatory Rules" states: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this [Code] governs the duties and 
powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and the rights and interests of a beneficiary. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE (2000). 
17. See, e.g., Van Siclen v. Bartol, 95 F. 793, 797-98 (E.D. Pa. 1899); Warren v. Pazolt, 89 N.E. 381, 
388-89 (Mass. I 909). 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 170-88. 
19. See UN1F. TRUST CODE§ 1008 (2000). The comments provide: 
To overcome the presumption of abuse in subsection (b), the trustee must establish that the 
clause was fair and that its existence and contents were adequately communicated to the 
settlor. In determining whether the clause was fair, the court may wish to examine: (I) the 
extent of the prior relationship between the settlor and trustee; (2) whether the settlor received 
independent advice; (3) the sophistication of the settlor with respect to business and fiduciary 
matters; (4) the trustee's reasons for inserting the clause; and (5) the scope of the particular 
provision inserted. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts§ 222 cmt. d (1959). 
The requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied if the sett/or was represented by independent 
counsel. If the sett/or was represented by independent counsel, the sett/or's attorney is 
considered the drafter of the instrument even if the attorney used the trustee's form. Because 
the sett/or's attorney is an agent of the sett/or, disclosure of an exculpatory term to the 
sett/or's attorney is disclosure to the sett/or. 
UNIF. TRusT CODE§ 1008 cmt. (2000) (emphasis added). 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 171-82. 
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the duty of loyalty, and has opened the door to arguments that the duty of 
loyalty's default rules should be relaxed to benefit trustees. Consider the UTC's 
treatment of the duty of loyalty: one provision validates a troubling state 
legislative trend that permits trustees to engage in a limited class of profitable 
transactions without a settlor's knowledge or authorization,21 while another 
eliminates the centuries-old no-further-inquiry rule with respect to an entire 
category of formerly prohibited transactions.22 
And more is on the way. In a just-published article, John Langbein argues 
that the duty of loyalty's no-further-inquiry rule should be eliminated altogether 
and replaced with a standard that would allow trustees to profit from their 
positions as long as the transactions are in the trust's best interests.23 This test, 
currently used in the corporate setting, would strike a fatal blow to the duty of 
loyalty as a moral norm, and would thus increase instances of trustee opportun-
ism, at least at the margins. 
This Article offers an analytical framework for limiting-but not eliminating-
parties' power to modify fiduciary duties. It concludes that narrow, transaction-
specific waivers are least likely to present asymmetrical information problems 
or norm erosion with its accompanying external effects, and that courts should 
generally enforce such narrow waivers. The analysis also shows that broad 
waivers, such as clauses that insulate institutional trustees from liability for 
breach of the duty of care or loyalty, are likely to implicate both information 
and externalities problems. 
After Part I's brief examination of traditional trust theory, Part II chronicles 
the development of the default rule theory in corporate law, and explains why 
critical differences between the corporate and trust contexts (particularly the 
absence of markets for beneficial interests in trust and the asymmetry of 
information between the typical settlor and institutional trustee) mandate signifi-
cant differences in the treatment of fiduciary duties. Part II also develops a 
normative framework for evaluating waivers of fiduciary duty, relying in large 
measure on the external benefits generated by maintaining a core of mandatory 
fiduciary duties. Part III applies these insights to the two most critical fiduciary 
duties-the duty of care and the duty of loyalty-and demonstrates that the 
traditional articulation of fiduciary duties in moral terms continues to serve an 
important social function, one that should not lightly be abandoned as mere 
"pulpit-thumping rhetoric."24 
21. See UNIF. TRusT CODE§ 802(0 (2000) and infra text accompanying notes 235-236. 
22. See UNIF. TRusT CODE§ 802(b)---{d) (2000). 
23. John Langbein, Questioning The Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 
YALE L.J. 929, 932 (2005). For a criticism of Langbein 's proposal, see Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of 
the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor Langbein, 47 WM. & MARYL. REv. 541 (2005). 
24. Langbein, supra note 6, at 629. Scholars who view fiduciary duties as freely waivable default 
rules insist, rather adamantly, that little significance should attach to courts' insistence on describing 
fiduciary duties in moral terms. They offer no compelling explanation for courts' insistent use of 
moralistic rhetoric and seem to explain away the phenomenon as a reflexive adherence to outdated 
language. See, e.g., id. at 629, 664-70 (urging courts to abandon their "pulpit-thumping" rhetoric); 
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I. TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY DUTY: TRADITIONAL THEORY 
Contract and trust law developed separately. Landowners arranged trust 
mechanisms (called "uses") as early as the thirteenth century.25 Under these 
simple arrangements, landowners transferred title to "feoffees" with the under-
standing that the feoffee would later transfer the property to a beneficiary of the 
owner's choosing.26 The landowner making the transfer trusted that the feoffee 
would not later tum disloyal and claim ownership of the property. Because uses 
were unenforceable at law, their effectiveness depended entirely on the trustee's 
behaving in a trustworthy manner.27 As uses grew in popularity, disgruntled 
beneficiaries could not tum to the common-law courts for help when the feoffee 
proved faithless; rigid pleading requirements barred their claims, 28 and contract 
law, which required a written covenant as a basis for recovery and awarded only 
damages to the prevailing party,29 proved useless. Beginning in the late four-
teenth and early fifteenth centuries, beneficiaries increasingly turned for justice 
to the Chancellor, 30 who granted relief on the theory that he was "compelling 
the trustee to act upon the dictates of his conscience."31 In other words, the 
Chancellor's role was to force the trustee to abide by his pre-existing moral or 
ethical obligation. By mid-fifteenth century, the Chancellor routinely enforced 
uses.32 
Thus, the duty of loyalty developed as an equitable doctrine to support and 
enforce pre-existing moral norms. As the trust evolved from a device for 
holding real property to an asset-management mechanism, fiduciary duties 
became more complex.33 Yet still, the trustee's pledge to place the beneficiaries' 
interests ahead of its own remained the essence of the relationship.34 To honor 
Easterbrook & Fischel , Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 427 (stating that "[f]iduciary 
duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing" and that "[c)ourts may of course deny that 
fiduciary obligations are fundamentally contractual"). This Article argues that courts' characterization 
of trustee fiduciary duties as grounded in moral norms supports those pre-existing norms and thereby 
limits negative external effects that would result from the deterioration of those norms. 
25. I AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1.3 ( 1939) [hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS]. 
26. See R. H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 1503, 1503 (1979). 
Professor Scott cites Professor Maitland for the proposition that uses were first employed to benefit 
Franciscan friars, who were prohibited from owning property. See I SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 25, § 
1.3, at 11-12. Uses were also used to defeat creditor claims and taxes, and to avoid feudal incidences. 
Id. § 1.4, at 14-16. 
27. See I SCOTT ON TRusTS, supra note 25, § 1.3, at 12; Helrnholz, supra note 26, at 1503. Helmholz 
questions why uses would increase in popularity despite the common-law courts' refusal to enforce 
them, and posits that ecclesiastical courts might have enforced uses in the years before courts of equity 
did. Id. at 1503--04. 
28. I SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 25, § 1.4, at 13. 
29. See id. § 1.4, at 13; Langbein, supra note 6, at 634-35. 
30. Id. § 1.4, at 13. 
31. Id.§ I, at 5. 
32. Id. § 1.4, at 13. 
33. Langbein, supra note 6, at 637-38. 
34. For example, Bogert defines a trust as "a fiduciary relationship," not as a relationship that may or 
may not have fiduciary characteristics depending upon the parties ' preferences. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, 
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the "trust" that was the essence of the arrangement, fiduciary duties expanded to 
prohibit all forms of opportunistic behavior. From this, clear rules followed: 
trustees must use reasonable care, must abstain from self-dealing, and must not 
co-mingle funds. 35 
Over the past one hundred years, scholars have clashed over whether the trust 
mechanism is grounded in property or contract law. 36 Although both camps 
acknowledged that settlors could authorize trustees to engage in particular acts 
that would otherwise be a breach of the trustee's duty,37 scholars differed on the 
significance of this fact. Those who viewed trusts as contracts emphasized that 
trust formation included voluntary bargaining38 and cited settlors' ability to 
modify trustee duties as evidence of their position. 39 Those in the "property" 
camp viewed fiduciary duties as the defining aspect of the trust,40 and disap-
proved of trustees' increasing attempts to waive or seriously modify essential 
duties.41 The majority of courts seemed to agree with this second camp: in cases 
where a professional trustee invoked a trust provision purporting to waive or 
modify its fiduciary duties as a defense to liability, courts generally took a hard 
line, enforcing exculpatory clauses by construing them strictly.42 Although some 
TRusTS 2 (6th ed. 1987); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 2 (1959) (defining a trust as "a 
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is 
held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person, which arises as a 
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it"); l SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 25, §§ 2.3-2.6, at 
40-48. 
35. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1935) (duty of loyalty); id. § 179 cmts. b--c (no 
commingling); 2 ScoTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 25, § 170, at 856; id. § 179, at 941. 
36. See Langbein, supra note 6, at 644-50 (recounting the debates between Scott and Maitland). 
37. See, e.g., 2 ScoTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 25, § 170.9 (reviewing instances where courts, on the 
ground that the trust instrument authorized self-dealing, upheld transactions that would otherwise be 
breaches of the duty of loyalty). 
38. See MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 29. 
39. See Langbein, supra note 6, at 657--ol. 
40. Bogert argued that because the trustee-beneficiary relationship is a "particularly intimate" one in 
which the trustee has great power over the beneficiaries' affairs "[t]he relationship is not an ordinary 
business one." BOGERT, supra note 34, at 2. Instead, the trustee is required to act solely in the 
beneficiaries' interest, with "strict honesty and candor." Id. Scott observed that the fiduciary relationship 
between trustee and beneficiary is "peculiarly intense," SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 25, §§ 2.5, 170, 
and noted that certain fiduciary obligations had a moral component. See, e.g., id. § 170.1, at 859 
(discussing the precedential rationale against self-dealing). 
41. For example, Bogert opined that: 
The ethics of the demand by corporate trustees for the insertion of an exculpatory clause 
seems dubious, to say the least. After advertising great skill and ability, and impliedly 
promising to use all that care and capacity in any trust where it is chosen trustee, the bank or 
trust company should not insist that the [settlor] hold the trustee to a lower standard of 
performance. 
BOGERT, supra note 34, at 340. 
42. See First Ala. Bank of Huntsville v. Spragins, 515 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. 1987) (holding that 
"although a trustee's duties and obligations are governed largely by the trust agreement, that agreement 
cannot be employed to vitiate 'the duty imposed by the "prudent person" standard"'); McNeil v. 
McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002) (considering a trust provision that protected the trustee from 
liability for negligence, and concluding that the trustee was liable for breach of trust, because "[a] 
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scholars insist that courts routinely enforced such clauses, a close analysis 
of the case law undermines the force of that conclusion. Even the cases cited 
by the Restatement (Second) as evidence that some courts routinely en-
forced exculpatory provisions show only that courts enforced waiver provi-
sions in cases involving special circumstances that do not justify overbroad 
generalizations. 43 
reasonable construction of these provisions . . . is that the Lois Trustees were exculpated for ordinary 
negligence, but not the duty to (i) inform beneficiaries or (ii) treat them impartially"); In re Trusteeship 
of Williams, 591 N.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding the validity of an exculpatory 
clause shielding trustees from liability for errors in judgment, but finding that the trustee's failure to sell 
declining stock for over four years, even though the stock comprised the majority of the trust's assets, 
could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, because the failure was possibly negligence rather than "an 
error in judgment"); Semler v. CoreStates Bank, 693 A.2d 1198, 1208 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1997) 
(holding the trustee liable for negligence on the ground that the trustee's negligent acts fell outside the 
scope of protection the exculpatory clause provided); Behrman v. Egan, 95 A.2d 599, 601 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1953) (stating that an exculpatory clause cannot relieve a trustee from liability "where a 
loss results from negligence in the administration of a trust") (citing Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 
60 A.2d 630 (N.J. Ch. 1948)); Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 53 A.2d 225 (NJ. Ch. 1947), aff'd, 64 
A.2d 214 (NJ. 1949); Villard v. Villard, 114 N.E. 789, 794-95 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that a clause 
purporting to shield the trustee from liability for retaining investments originally held by the settlor did 
not shield the trustee from liability for failing to sell investments that it did not know were not part of 
the settlor's estate); In re Rushmore's Estate, 21 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529-30 (Sur. Ct. 1940) (holding that an 
exculpatory clause directing that the trustee would not be held liable "for any act done . .. in good faith 
hereunder" did not shield the trustee from liability for "non-legal" investments); Bauer v. Bauem-
schmidt, 589 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that an exculpatory clause did not protect 
the trustee from liability for making certain negligent expenditures); Jewett v. Capital Nat'! Bank, 618 
S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (holding that an exculpatory clause relieving the trustee of 
liability for investing in speculative stocks did not shield the trustee from liability for negligence in 
failing to diversify the trust's assets). 
43. As the Restatement (Second) of Trusts indicates, courts in the early part of the twentieth century 
did not take a consistent approach to the issue of whether trustees could escape liability by invoking 
exculpatory clauses. Courts often found trustees liable by construing exculpatory clauses narrowly. See 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ThusTs § 222 reporter's notes. Although the Restatement (Second) also 
indicates that some courts routinely enforced exculpatory clauses, see id., a close look at the cases cited 
in support of this proposition do not persuasively support it. In fact, most courts validated exculpatory 
clauses only (l) after finding that the trustee's conduct was not in fact negligent at all, In re City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co., 61 N.Y.S.2d 484, 487 (App. Div. 1946); In re Nuese's Estate, 96 A.2d 298, 302 
(Essex County Ct. 1953); (2) if the trustee had been a friend or relative of the settlor, In re Mallon's 
Estate, 89 N.Y.S. 554 (Sur. Ct. 1904); Crabb v. Young, 92 N.Y. 56, 67--68 (1883) (settlor named his 
children as trustees); (3) the settler and/or beneficiaries expressly acquiesced in trustee's conduct and 
profited from it, In re Leupp, 153 A. 842 (NJ. Ch. 1931); (4) if the trust at issue was not the 
prototypical private express trust, but set up pursuant to an investment or business arrangement, 
Gardner v. Squire, 49 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942); or (5) if the clause was not a broad grant of 
immunity from liability from negligence, but a narrowly tailored, transaction-specific waiver, and the 
conduct complained of fell squarely within the clause's protection, Farr v. First Camden Nat'l Bank & 
Trust, 66 A.2d 444, 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949). This Article offers a theoretical framework 
that explains why courts might uphold exculpatory clauses in those types of cases, but not in all cases. 
See infra text accompanying notes 165-170. In fairness, Massachusetts is a stark exception to this 
analysis. Cases in that state do stand as precedent that courts will routinely invoke exculpatory clauses 
to shield trustees from liability for negligent acts. See, e.g., Warren v. Pazolt, 89 N.E. 381, 390 (Mass. 
1909). 
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II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS FREELY WAIVABLE DEFAULT RULES 
Although the argument that trusts are a species of contract has existed for at 
least a century, the precise characterization of fiduciary duties as mere "default 
rules" crystalized only in the past fifteen years. In trust law, Professor John 
Langbein has argued that fiduciary duties are, in the main, default rules, freely 
waivable with the parties' consent.44 This development in trust law has paral-
leled, and perhaps been influenced by, the work of prominent corporate law 
scholars.45 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that corporate fidu-
ciary standards are, and should be, default rules--off-the-rack contract terms 
designed, in general, to maximize shareholder value.46 The UTC embraces that 
premise in the trust context, but without sufficient attention to qualifications 
dictated by the special nature of the private trust relationship.47 This Part 
explores why the argument that corporate fiduciary rules are, and should be, 
44. Langbein does, however, recognize that there are some limits on the parties ' ability to contract 
around fiduciary protections. See Langbein, supra note 6, at 650-51 ; Langbein, supra note 13, at 111 2, 
1122-23. He explains trust law's prohibitions on waivers of the duty of loyalty in its entirety, or the 
trustee's duty to act in good faith, as " intent effectuating" rules. Id. at 1122-24. In other words, because 
no informed settlor would agree to those provisions, their inclusion in a trust document is evidence that 
the settlor did not understand the trust document. See Id. at 1124. He does not, however, explore 
whether the asymmetrical information problem would justify a court in striking less extreme exculpa-
tory clauses, such as a clause that relieves the trustee of liability for gross negligence. Langbein also 
views freely bargained waivers of trust law rules with the purpose--or effect--of imposing onerous 
dead-hand control as unenforceable. See id. Finally, he states that while any of the core fiduciary duties 
are negotiable, the trust instrument must not waive all of them in their entirety. Id. at 1122-23. Sitkoff, 
accepting these limits, additionally argues that rules "that govern the trustee's liability toward creditors 
of the trust property tend to be mandatory with respect to the settlor, but default with respect to the 
trustee and those with whom the trustee deals," because such rules deal with the rights of outsiders to 
the trust organization. Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 641-42. 
45. In support of his thesis that trusts are contracts, Langbein emphasizes Easterbrook and Fischel 's 
work, and characterizes fiduciary duties as default rules. See Langbein, supra note 6, at 657-{)9. 
Hansmann and Mattei , themselves corporate scholars, readily concede that the deal between settlor and 
trustee is contract-based. See Hansmann & Mattei , supra note 9, at 470. They further argue, however, 
that "it is precisely the property-like aspects of the trust that are the principal contribution of trust law." 
See id. at 469. It is beyond the scope of their project to analyze whether and to what extent fiduciary 
duties should be mandatory, even within the contract paradigm. Id. at 449-50. Recently, Sitkoff has 
argued that the absence of market pressures distinguishes the trust from the public corporation, and that 
the resulting absence of effective monitoring controls justifies the imposition of greater fiduciary duties 
in the trust context. See generally Robert Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market 
Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565 (2003). He does not, however, consider the negative implications that 
waiver of these duties, which is permitted under the UTC, will have on beneficiaries and settlors. 
46. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 90-108; Easterbrook & Fischel , Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 437; see also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of 
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. I, 29 (1990) (arguing that 
"[t]he critical point to understand under the contract theory is that fiduciary duties are not distinct from 
the contract but are simply one of many drafting alternatives"). 
47. The UTC provides that the trust document may override all UTC provisions except certain 
specifically enumerated ones. See UNIF. TuusT CooE § 105(a) (2000) (providing that the trust document 
may modify or waive any of the UTC rules except those provided in subsection (b)); id. § I05(b) 
(listing mandatory trust rules, which include the duty of the trustee to act in good faith and in 
accordance with trust purposes, the requirement that the trust be for the benefit of the beneficiaries, and 
limiting the permissible scope of an exculpatory clause to prohibit clauses that shield the trustee from 
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fully and freely modifiable is considerably weaker in the trust context.48 
A. CORPORATE CONTRACT THEORY: FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS DEFAULT RULES 
1. Fiduciary Duties and Agency Costs 
77 
The "nexus of contracts"49 view of the firm has had a profound impact on the 
development of corporate doctrine.50 The theory has at its core a notion of the 
corporation as a "nexus of contracts"-voluntary agreements between manage-
ment and employees, management and creditors, management and investors.51 
liability for conduct that is in bad faith or committed with reckless indifference to the beneficiaries' 
interests). 
48. Easterbrook & Fischel recognize that fiduciary rules vary in accordance with the context of each 
particular fiduciary relationship. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 
4, at 432 (stating "[t]hat fiduciary duties deviate substantially from one agency relation to another, no 
one could deny"); id. at 427 (stating that "[o]bligations implied to maximize value in high-transactions-
costs cases may have some things in common, but differences in the underlying transactions will call 
for different 'fiduciary' obligations, just as actual contracts differ across markets"). They also recognize 
that differences in fiduciary rules across relationships are related to differences in the transaction costs 
of contracting and monitoring costs. Id. at 432. The authors acknowledge that fiduciary rules applicable 
to trustees are therefore more stringent. Id. 
Yet, because Easterbrook and Fischel's principal focus concerns the corporate firm, they have not 
engaged in a detailed exploration of trust law. Instead, they assume (without much analysis of trust 
law's contextual backdrop) that trustees' fiduciary duties are, and should be, freely and completely 
waivable. See, e.g., id. (noting that the trustee's duties of care and loyalty are interpreted more 
stringently in the trust context, but stating that "[a)ll rules are freely variable by contract in advance"). 
49. Ronald Coase developed the "nexus of contracts" approach to corporate law, see generally R.H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 ( 1937). Multitudes of scholars have expanded on his 
work. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & F1scHEL, supra note 3, at 12; Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972); Steven 
N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. I (1983); Michael C. Jensen, 
Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 Acer. REv. 319, 326 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior; Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FrN. EcoN. 305 (1976); William A. Klein, The Modem Business Organization: Bargaining Under 
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. I 197 
(1984); see generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). 
50. See infra note 51 for a review of the literature arguing against the contractarian theory of the 
firm. 
51 . See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 49, at 310 (stating that firms are legal fictions that "serve as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals"). Although the parties do not always 
haggle over terms, see EASTERBROOK & F1scHEL, supra note 3, at 14, 16, the essential elements of 
contract arguably are present. See id. at 8-15. In exchange for management's promise to abide by the 
terms of the corporate charter, shareholders voluntarily invest in the corporation. See id. at 14. 
The contract theory of the corporation is controversial and has prominent detractors. See Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: Foreword; The Debate on Contractual Freedom in 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1395 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Debate on Contrac-
tual Freedom in Corporate Law] ; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate 
Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1825 (1989) 
[hereinafter Bebchuk, Constraints on Charter Amendments]; Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, 
Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1403 ( 1985); John C. Coffee, Jr. , 
The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1618, 1622-27, 1690--91 (1989) [hereinafter Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance] (arguing that "the 
permissibility of deviations from the traditional standards of corporate law should be judged primarily 
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The corporate structure's separation of ownership and control creates agency 
costs that the "contract" must anticipate and control.52 Those costs are commen-
surate with the size of the manager's stake in the corporation; the less her 
interest is aligned with shareholders, the greater the potential agency costs. 53 
When interests of managers and shareholders diverge, managers face incentives 
to benefit themselves at the expense of the shareholder, or to shirk when 
shirking is in management's self-interest.54 Thus, if shareholders actually haggled 
over corporate contract "terms," they might insist on terms to minimize agency 
costs.55 
But the nature of the "contractual" relationship makes contracting to reduce 
agency costs difficult. The corporate "contract" is relational, not contemplating 
a one-shot performance by each party, but a continuing relationship that may 
stretch years into the future. 56 Parties cannot draft agreements that accurately 
anticipate and resolve all future conflicts.57 Even if they could, transaction costs 
involved in contracting to meet every conceivable future event would be 
prohibitive.58 Enter fiduciary duties, an efficient alternative to "elaborate prom-
in terms of the competence of courts or other agencies to monitor these departures and prevent 
opportunism" and calling for a "middle ground" which scrutinizes when courts can and should be so 
empowered); John C. Coffee, Jr. , No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 
and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919, 924-25 (1988) [hereinafter Coffee, No Exit] 
(rejecting the "hypothetical bargaining" underpinnings of contractarian theory and arguing that optimal 
default rules do not maximize wealth, but rather disclose the discretionary power one party plans to 
exercise over another, thereby justifying some judicial paternalism as well as the consideration of 
external effects); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 CoLUM. L. REv. 1253, 
1273-75 (1999) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Social Norms] (arguing that not all waivable rules are contrac-
tual in nature and that contractarian theory "ignores the expressive function of law"); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 146 I (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, 
The Structure of Corporation Law]. Professor Tamar Frankel also argues more generally that "if we 
wish to create and maintain efficient markets, contract law--especially the freedom of contracting 
parties to customize their relationship-must yield to the mandatory rules of property law." Tamar 
Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 
389,391 (1993). 
52. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 49, at 308; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 
8-11, 91-93; Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 426; Eisenberg, 
The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note 51 , at 1471 n.46; Fama & Jensen, supra note 49, at 304. 
53. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 91; Fama & Jensen, supra note 49, at 308. 
54. See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note 51, at 1471-74. 
55 . EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 90-93; Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary 
Duty, supra note 4, at 426-27. 
56. See, e.g., OLrvER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 70-72 (1985); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 168 (noting 
that "[a]s firms evolve, the appropriate relation between residual risk bearers and the managers evolves 
too," positing that the minimization of agency costs requires a "combination of fiduciary principle with 
a mechanism to replace [ ... ] managers," and concluding that such a mechanism is necessary despite 
running contrary to contractarian analysis); Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 51, at 
1625 (stating that because a corporate charter "is the extreme example of a relational contract, it does 
not attempt to specify all the parties' expectations"). 
57. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 92; Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary 
Duty, supra note 4, at 426. 
58. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 92. 
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ises and extra monitoring."59 Fiduciary duties are best understood as the terms 
that the parties would have agreed to ex ante if they had anticipated the future 
conflict, and bargaining was costless.60 Fiduciary duties "preserve the gains 
resulting from the separation of management from risk bearing while limiting 
the ability of managers to give priority to their own interests over those of 
investors."61 Because fiduciary duties are default terms, the parties should 
generally be free to contract around them, or to authorize transactions that 
would otherwise constitute a breach of duty. 62 
2. The Market as a Policing Device 
A number of corporate scholars argue that a regime of freely waivable 
fiduciary duties will not hurt investors, because market mechanisms are suffi-
cient to control most forms of opportunistic behavior, including the insertion of 
inefficient provisions in corporate charters. 63 First, assuming full information, 
the stock price of the initial offering will reflect the value of any terms that are 
disadvantageous to shareholders, which will force management to internalize 
costs of opportunistic terms.64 As a result, management will attempt to ease 
59. Id. 
60. Id.; see also Sitkoff, supra note 45, at 577 (positing that "[i]nstead of getting bogged down in the 
impossibility of specifying conduct ex ante, fiduciary duties supply liability rules that call for an 'ex 
post settling up' in accordance with what the parties would have bargained for in advance"); Sitkoff, 
supra note 3, at 636-38. 
61. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 92. 
62. Even corporate scholars argue that a scheme that includes some mandatory rules is not 
inconsistent with the contractual view of the corporation. See Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, 
supra note 51, at 1619-20 (pointing out that "courts have invariably played an active and indispensable 
role" in interpreting relational contracts, and therefore "analogizing the corporation to a long-term 
contract may suggest not that the mandatory features of American corporate law are vestigial remnants 
of an earlier era that was hostile to private ordering, but rather that these provisions are analogous to 
similar legal rules that restrict opportunism in other areas of complex, long-term contracting); Bebchuk, 
The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, supra note 51, at 1408--09 (1989) (arguing, 
with respect to the corporate context, that "one may accept the contractual view of the corporation and 
at the same time reject the freedom-to-opt-out position and support a substantial number of mandatory 
rules"). 
63. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 17-22; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory 
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1557--n6 (1989); see also Butler & Ribstein, 
supra note 46, at 33-45. 
Tamar Frankel, who generally objects to contractarian characterization of fiduciary duties, argues that 
benefits produced by market incentives are outweighed by the costs market forces create by entrenching 
those in power. Specifically, Frankel notes that corporate fiduciaries keep the entrusted property when 
disgruntled shareholders exit and sell it to others, which insulates those fiduciaries from judicial 
oversight. Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 5, at 1257-58. 
64. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 21 (stating that if corporate charters contain 
disadvantageous terms, investors will go elsewhere); Butler & Ribstein, supra note 46, at 33-45 
(arguing that markets are efficient and that corporate terms are fully reflected in stock prices, and 
concluding that "the presence of play in the corporate contract suggests, rather than a failure of 
contracting, a recognition that the least costly way of dealing with agency costs may be to allow them 
to be checked by incentive or monitoring devices instead of by liability rules"); Gordon, supra note 63, 
at 1562--n3 (arguing that stock prices do telegraph information about charter terms). But see Frankel, 
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fiduciary duties only when doing so will maximize value.65 Second, the market 
creates significant pressures that minimize agency costs regardless of whether 
management is bound by fiduciary duties. For example, managers' compensa-
tion might be linked to performance. 66 The threat of a takeover of corporate 
control, the need to succeed in product markets, and the job market provide 
additional incentives for managers to perform in shareholders' best interests.67 
Moreover, a well-developed information market helps shareholders monitor 
management's performance.68 If shareholders learn of management's opportunis-
tic behavior, they will exit, causing stock prices to fall. Thus, although market 
forces may be inadequate to curb one-shot breaches of the "take the money and 
run" sort,69 for the most part fiduciaries will tend to minimize agency costs even 
if the corporate charter does not require them to do so. 
The above account assumes that investors have full information about the 
meaning and effect of the corporate charter's terms. Corporate contractarians 
argue that the assumption is justified. Even though a rational investor, who is 
heavily diversified, might choose to remain ignorant of charter terms, market 
forces minimize the impact of the information problem.7° First, underwriters 
will push management to offer optimal terms.71 Second, even if some rational 
investors fail to read the corporate charter, some significant number of investors 
will study it-institutional investors in particular have a strong incentive to 
possess full information regarding the details of the charter terms. 72 Moreover, a 
powerful secondary information market exists that helps shareholders who seek 
supra note 5, at 1221 (doubting that stock prices can communicate significant information about the 
quality of the fiduciary, because those prices reflect large quantities of information). 
65. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Constraints on Charter Amendments, supra note 51, at 1826-27. 
66. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 5; see Butler & Ribstein, supra note 46, at 27. 
67. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 68, 91, 95-97; Butler & Ribstein, supra note 46, at 
27 . 
68. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 96-97. 
69. Id. at 103. 
70. See id. at 17-22; Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, supra note 63, at 
1565-68 (concluding that concern for protecting investors does not justify the imposition of mandatory 
corporate rules, because uninformed investors can free-ride on informed investors efforts; in equilib-
rium, there will be a sufficient number of informed investors, because there is an information market, 
and underwriters push for optimal terms). 
71. Gordon, supra note 63, at 1559. 
72. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 18-22 (stating that "[t]he price of stocks traded in 
public markets is established by professional investors, not by amateurs" and, drawing on other 
academic literature, arguing that stock price reflects the value of charter terms, which protects 
uninformed investors); see also Gordon, supra note 63, at 1557-58. 
Melvin Eisenberg is not persuaded on this point. He argues that "many investors in IPO stock are 
relatively uninformed," and posits that situations exist where institutional investors, upon whom 
smaller investors might normally free-ride, lack the incentive to adequately price, or the foresight to 
accurately forecast, "variations in core fiduciary and structural rules." Eisenberg, The Structure of 
Corporation Law, supra note 51 , at 1517. He argues further that underwriters may agree to "inappropri-
ate" terms in order to obtain the issue, or might be unaware of the underlying market value of the 
security, due to preliminary investors' ignorance of the "corporation's constitutive rules." See id. at 
1517-20. 
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information find it.73 Because there will be a sufficient number of well-informed 
investors, the stock will be adequately priced, allowing uninformed investors to 
free ride on informed investors' efforts.74 
Contractarians assume that the contract model applies equally well to the 
close corporation.75 Though they acknowledge the absence of market forces, 
they argue that sufficient substitutes exist. They emphasize that close corporate 
fiduciaries usually own a large chunk of the corporation. Because they will have 
to absorb the cost of their own bad behavior, "what is good for [the fiduciary] is 
also good for the firm (and for the other participants)."76 Easterbrook and 
Fischel note that close corporations are often founded on pre-existing trust-
based relationships which, in their view, minimize agency costs.77 Finally, 
contractarians argue that close corporation shareholders have more incentive 
and a greater opportunity to monitor fiduciary behavior.78 
Although some scholars acknowledge that close corporation shareholders 
have strictly limited exit options, they do not view this as a sufficient justifica-
tion for imposing mandatory fiduciary terms. Instead, they argue that the 
inability to exit will cause most close corporate shareholders to incorporate 
standard fiduciary protections into their agreemei:it.79 The contractarian analysis 
assumes that the parties to the deal have full information and equal bargaining 
power.80 
73. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 96--97. 
74. See Gordon, supra note 63, at 1557--65 (positing that "the investor protection hypothesis," which 
holds that mandatory rules are necessary to protect both informed and uninformed investors from 
opportunistic charter provisions, does not explain the existence of mandatory corporate law, and 
arguing that evidence exists to demonstrate that charter provisions provide adequate price signals). But 
see Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 51, at 1624 (arguing that "given the informational 
asymmetries and collective action problems that are inherent to the corporate context, there is reason to 
doubt the market's ability to price accurately the impact of innovative charter provisions that confer 
potential power on managers to behave opportunistically"). 
75. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. 
L. REV. 271 (1986); Butler & Ribstein, supra note 46. 
76. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 75, at 274. 
77. Id. 
78. Id.; see also Butler & Ribstein, supra note 46, at 20. 
79. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 46, at 10--11. 
80. The case for freely waivable fiduciary duties arguably is weaker in the close corporation context. 
That many close corporations are built on pre-existing relationships of trust can cut the other way: it 
may induce parties to be less vigilant monitors than they would be otherwise. It may also indicate that 
the parties do not have equal bargaining power. Perhaps it is for these reasons that the Model Business 
Corporation Act expressly prohibits complete waiver of the duty of care or loyalty and invalidates 
exculpatory clauses that purport to insulate directors from liability more broadly than the act permits. 
See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 7.32(a) cmt. at 7-76 (2002). The Florida legislature describes as against 
public policy agreements that lessen the directors' duties of care or loyalty, or exculpate the directors 
from liability for duties imposed by the Florida statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 607 .0732(h) (West 2001). 
Many state courts refuse to enforce blanket waivers of fiduciary duties in close corporation charters, 
and California caselaw explicitly suggests that such waivers violate public policy. See Neubauer v. 
Goldfarb, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 223-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (construing CAL Civ. CODE§ 1668 (West 
I 985)). 
Because the contract model works best when applied to general partnerships, Larry Ribstein argues 
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B. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE TRUSTEE 
As in the corporate context, agency costs are a central problem with the 
private express trust, and fiduciary duties may be conceptualized as mechanisms 
that control agency costs.81 But trust scholarship has yet to develop an analyti-
cal framework for evaluating the degree to which parties to the trust should be 
free to modify fiduciary duties. As we have seen, market monitoring is crucial to 
the view of fiduciary rules as freely waivable default provisions in the corporate 
context; market forces induce behavior consistent with fiduciary standards by 
disciplining departures from fiduciary norms that decrease value. Who, then, 
will monitor opportunistic behavior by the private trustee? Does the market 
perform that function here? If not, are settlors or beneficiaries adequate moni-
tors? 
1. The Market as a Monitor of Trustee's Misbehavior 
Almost none of the market forces that pressure corporate fiduciaries to forgo 
opportunistic behavior are at play in the trust context. There is no "share price" 
or secondary information market that informs other potential customers of a 
trust term that reduces fiduciary duties or communicates trustees' opportunistic 
behavior to potential customers. Even if a particular beneficiary discovers that 
her trustee is performing poorly, she will be unlikely to communicate this to the 
trustee's other clients, of whom she is unaware.82 Moreover, that beneficiary 
that there should be no mandatory partnership rules. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of 
the Project to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 111, 138 (1990) (stating that "waivers 
in the partnership context are normally negotiated by knowledgeable parties at arms' length. This is 
hardly a situation in which mandatory rules are necessary to protect unwary parties"). Because general 
partners make equal financial and management contributions, face equal liability, and have equal access 
to records and other facts, they have both the incentive and the ability to monitor other partners' 
performance. 
The Uniform Partnership Act ("U.P.A.") warmly embraces the contractarian approach. Limits on 
waiving fiduciary duties are constrained to those situations where the waiver is so unreasonable as to 
indicate the presence of significant asymmetries in bargaining power, information or business sophistica-
tion. See UNIF. P'slllP Acr § 21(b}-(c) (2005). 
For criticisms of the U.P.A.'s contractarian approach to partnership law, see Allan W. Vestal, 
Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REv. 
523 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at RUPA's 
Fiduciary Provisions, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 465 (1997). For an analysis of whether the contractarian 
approach should apply to LLPs, see Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual 
Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the UC, 
152 U. PA. L. REv. 1609 (2004). 
81. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 426-27; Langbein, 
supra note 6, at 658 (concluding that "[l]oyalty and prudence, the norms of trust fiduciary law, embody 
the default regime that the parties to the trust deal would choose as the criteria for regulating the 
trustee's behavior in these settings in which it is impractical to foresee precise circumstances and to 
specify more exact terms"); Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 652 (noting that the trustee's duty of impartiality, 
unique to trust law, controls agency costs not present in other organizational relationships that are 
subjected to fiduciary duties) . 
82. Further, she cannot easily replace the trustee. See Sitkoff, supra note 45, at 571 . 
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cannot exit if she is dissatisfied. 83 
In addition, trustees need not worry about raising money, maintammg or 
increasing stock prices, or responding to the threat of hostile takeovers. Al-
though employees of trust companies may be concerned about the labor market, 
it pressures them less than it does their corporate counterparts. Because there is 
no information market that reveals their poor performance, employees of trust 
companies may be less concerned about finding a new job if they are termi-
nated. Thus, "ex post settling up in markets"84 will too infrequently occur when 
a trustee acts opportunistically with respect to any particular trust account. 
When the trustee is an individual professional, the problem is compounded.85 
John Langbein points out that professional trustees often obtain business 
from trust attorneys who recommend trustees to their clients, and this creates an 
incentive for trustees to behave in accordance with fiduciary standards.86 But 
this pressure, to the extent it exists, is insufficient to substitute for the market 
pressures the corporate fiduciary faces. First, trust attorneys draft trust agree-
ments, but do not generally monitor trustee behavior after the trust is up and 
running. The attorney has little incentive to monitor trustee behavior, unless she 
is later retained by the beneficiaries. Even if the attorney wanted to monitor the 
trustee, the attorney is not a party to the trust arrangement and (absent retention 
by trust beneficiaries) has no right to receive accountings or other information 
83. Sitkoff notes that aftermarkets for beneficiaries' interests are weak; moreover, in many trusts, 
spendthrift clauses prevent beneficiaries from alienating their interest even involuntarily. See Sitkoff, 
supra note 45, at 570. Her only recourse is to mount a suit for breach of fiduciary duty. Because 
lawsuits are expensive, beneficiaries are likely to bring them only in those relatively rare instances 
where opportunism can be clearly proven and recovery is likely to be large. This knowledge of the 
beneficiaries' relative lack of options may cause less than honorable trustees to push the envelope 
toward opportunistic behavior. 
84. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 104 (noting that directors have reputational 
concerns and face "ex post settling up in labor and capital markets"). Easterbrook and Fischel argue that 
due to the presence of information markets, ex post settling up is a more efficient tool than judicial 
intervention. See id. at 99. 
85. Perhaps because of the lack of market constraints, federal and state governments bring regula-
tory pressure to bear on institutional trustees. Cf Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and 
Fischel, "Contract and Fiduciary Duty," 36 J.L. & EcoN. 447, 449 (1993) (positing that difficulties in 
monitoring and contract specification for certain commercial relationships may be severe enough to 
warrant that statutory regulation trump contract flexibility). A significant number of institutions may 
strive to comply scrupulously with applicable regulations, which goes a long way toward curbing 
trustees' opportunistic behavior. Yet these regulations are not a sufficient substitute for market pressure. 
Stringency and enforcement vary from state to state, and focus only on regulating specific aspects of 
trustee behavior. Fear of regulators is also unlikely to curb spectacular, one-shot instances of self-
dealing by an individual trustee employee. The result is that institutions that confine their business to 
extraordinarily high net worth clients are those most likely to comply with federal or state regulations, 
while those which are newer to the business, or less scrupulous, are the least likely to be influenced by 
fear of regulators. Moreover, regulations do not act as a check on forms of opportunistic behavior that 
they do not cover. This goes double for individual professional trustees, who escape regulation 
altogether. Although professional rules might require lawyers or accountants to conform to fiduciary 
standards, there is no regulatory body to enforce those standards in advance of a breach of duty. And 
when regulation fails to curb opportunism, there is no market to fill the void. 
86. Langbein, Questioning the Duty of Loyalty, supra note 23, at 937. 
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about trust investments. At most, the desire for recommendations may induce 
trustees to behave honorably during contract negotiation. 
Second, Langbein's model of the trust attorney who recommends trustees to 
clients is increasingly less apt. With increasing frequency, it is the trustee who 
works with, and has authority over, the settlor's attorney. The client may consult 
an investment adviser, who recommends a revocable living trust and an attorney 
to look over the documents. When attorneys are the ones seeking the recommen-
dations, trustees face little pressure to impress them. 87 
2. The Parties as Monitors 
Of course, if the parties to the trust deal can adequately monitor trustee 
behavior, then the absence of market controls is less problematic for those who 
advocate the default rule characterization of fiduciary duties. Because the settlor 
typically will die before the expiration of the trust, monitoring generally falls to 
the trust's beneficiaries. 
Beneficiaries, however, are in a poor position to monitor the trustee's behav-
ior. Often, the beneficiary received the gift in trust, as opposed to outright, 
because the settlor had doubts about the beneficiary's financial sophistication. 
Beneficiaries who are minors, incapacitated, or who lack financial sophistication 
will be unable to determine whether a trustee is behaving opportunistically. 
Because of this imbalance of capacity and information, beneficiaries are likely 
to place substantial trust in the trustee. The trustee's advertised reputation of 
trustworthiness encourages beneficiaries' reliance on its judgment. Or, if the 
trustee is an individual, chosen by the settlor for her honesty, competence and 
knowledge of family relationships, the beneficiary trusts that the trustee will 
continue to act consistently with past behavior. In either case, the beneficiary is 
predisposed to believe that the trustee acts at all times in the beneficiary's best 
interests. Thus, beneficiaries are not likely to be adequate monitors of trustee 
performance, which gives a less-than-trustworthy trustee incentive to behave 
opportunistically. 
Of course, one might argue that the settlor is in the best position to determine 
whether modifying the trustee's fiduciary duties might maximize beneficiary 
wealth. If the settlor prefers to modify the trustee's common-law duties, she is 
87. See, e.g., State v. Laden, 893 P.2d 771 , 772 (Colo. 1995) (publicly censuring an attorney for 
aiding a trust marketer in the unauthorized practice of law by issuing standard form advice letters in 
response to the trust marketer's clients ' requests for legal advice) ; Comm. on Prof ' ! Ethics v. Matias, 
521 N.W.2d 704, 706-07 (Iowa 1994) (lawyer's license suspended for accepting referrals from a 
company that marketed living trusts) ; Comm. on Prof' ! Ethics & Conduct v. Baker, 492 N.W.2d 695, 
702--04 (Iowa 1992) (reprimanding an attorney for accepting over 100 referrals from a financial 
services company establishing living trusts and failing to advise clients in a disinterested fashion); In re 
Mid-America Living Trust Assocs., 927 S.W.2d 855, 871 (Mo. 1996) (enjoining a living trust company, 
which sold living trust kits to clients and recommended attorneys to those clients, from doing business 
in Missouri); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Kathman, 748 N.E.2d 1091, 1097 (Ohio 2001) (suspending an 
attorney from practicing law for aiding a trust marketer in the unauthorized practice of law and failing 
to render meaningful legal advice to the trust marketer's customers). 
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indicating that she thinks that the beneficiaries will be better off if the trustee is 
not constrained by rigid duties. 
That the trust document contains terms that purport to modify or waive 
fiduciary duties is not always evidence that the settlor made a knowing determi-
nation that the waiver would maximize value. Notwithstanding the settlor's 
large investment, the settlor may lack information that is critical to understand-
ing and pricing a waiver. 88 For various reasons, the settlor may be unaware of 
the waiver provision, or may fail to understand its meaning. Even when the 
settlor purports to understand the waiver, the settlor's lack of foresight inhibits 
her ability to understand how the waiver will be construed in light of events that 
will occur long after the settlor's death. The information problem is an asymmetri-
cal one, because professional trustees have economies of scale in understanding 
the nature and effect of trust provisions. 89 As the following discussion suggests, 
information deficits may induce the settlor to agree to waive fiduciary duties 
even when a waiver would decrease, rather than maximize, trust value.90 
First, the unrepresented settlor may not know that the trust document, which 
is provided by the trustee, includes a provision waiving or reducing fiduciary 
standards. Even if the settlor spots the language, she may not understand the 
legal rights that she is waiving. In choosing a professional trustee, the settlor 
relies on the professional's reputation and representations about its loyalty and 
skill in managing trust assets. The unrepresented settlor may not spot or belabor 
the waiver language, because it might not occur to her that the trustee would 
attempt to escape or diminish the duties that are the essence of the deal.91 The 
settlor is even less likely to look for a waiver term when she has chosen a 
professional with whom she has had a long-term relationship based on trust, 
such as an attorney or accountant. 92 
88. Hansmann, Mattei, and Langbein recognize that settlors may lack sufficient information to 
evaluate certain waivers, and they offer that fact as a justification for trust law's prohibition on waiver 
of the duty of loyalty in its entirety. Yet none of these authors expand on this insight to consider 
whether the asymmetrical information problem might justify more rigid fiduciary terms. See Hansmann 
& Mattei, supra note 9, at 448-49; Langbein, supra note 13, at 1124. 
89. Cf Gordon, supra note 63, at 1565 (arguing that "uncertainty about operation of the customized 
term is likely to run against the prospective shareholder and in favor of the firm," because the firm has a 
greater incentive than the shareholder to understand how a particular customized charter term will 
operate). 
90. Cf Romano, supra note 85, at 449-50 (positing that higher fiduciary duties may be necessary in 
certain commercial relationships due to the absence of market pressures); see generally Sitkoff, supra 
note 45. 
91. Similarly, John Coffee notes that the asymmetrical information problem is a critical one when a 
shareholder is faced with a broad waiver of a fiduciary duty, because most shareholders will assume 
that directors will abide by moral constraints for their own sake and out of concern for reputation: 
"when legal rules are suspended but nonlegal constraints remain, the result is to create unproductive 
uncertainty." Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 5 I, at 1669. Here, he argues, a manda-
tory rule prohibiting a waiver that would allow departure from moral norms is efficient. Id. at 1669-70. 
92. Indeed the UTC acknowledges as much, imposing on the trustee the burden of proof that the 
exculpatory clause inserted by the drafter/trustee be "fair under the circumstances" and that "its 
existence and content" be "adequately communicated to the settlor." UNIF. ThusT CooE § 1008(b)(2) 
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Even the settlor who is represented by counsel may be ignorant of the 
waiver's existence or meaning. Of course, the vast majority of attorneys will 
ably represent their clients, and will not agree to an exculpatory clause that runs 
counter to their clients' best interests or neglect to explain the clause to their 
clients in full. In the traditional model, a wealthy client selects a family lawyer 
whose primary motive is to protect the settlor by choosing a reputable trustee 
and drafting a trust instrument thoroughly protective of the beneficiaries' inter-
ests. However, the traditional model has become less prevalent in recent years, 
as commercial banks and traditional trust companies lose market share to 
brokerage firms and other non-traditional trust providers.93 When these institu-
tions, which aggressively market trusts to their customers, suggest potential 
lawyers to their clients, the lawyers have an incentive to protect their referral 
source.94 In recent years, the overly close relationship between lawyers and trust 
(2000). However, the UTC guts the protection that this standard ostensibly provides by directing that 
such a provision is presumed to be fair if the settlor was represented by counsel. See infra text 
accompanying notes 191-94. 
93. See Comizio & Hare, supra note I, at 1300. The authors establish that "banks have traditionally 
dominated the trust market, but personal trust services are now being marketed by a variety of new 
competitors; as a result, banks have lost market share." Id. They note that, since the passage of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, financial service companies of all types are increasingly offering trust 
services. Id.; see also Diversified Servs. Group, Inc., Prospectus: Trust Distribution 2002: Business & 
Distribution Models & Tactics in the Non-Traditional Trust Market, http://www.dsg-candr.com/rrnreports/ 
trust_2002_dist.html (stating that "the number of depository institutions with trust powers and assets 
under management decreased by 20.1 %" over the three years ending in 1999); LoBue Associates, 
Non-Bank Competition Continues to Erode Bank Trust Marketshare (1998), http://www.lobue.com/ 
about_us/about_connections.html (stating that banks are experiencing an "alarming" drop in trust 
business, and that since 1990, "banks have lost more than half of the 65% market share they once 
enjoyed"). 
94. See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-ls Good 
Business Bad Ethics?, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 57, 115-25 (1984). Professor Johnston explains, 
It is a widespread practice among corporate fiduciaries to retain the services of the lawyer who 
drafted a will or trust in which a bank is named as executor or trustee to perform any legal 
work that may be necessary in estate or trust administration. In probating a testator's estate, 
legal services are virtually always needed because of the strict application of laws relating to 
unauthorized practice of law, which preclude corporate fiduciaries from handling matters 
processed through the probate court system. The policy of retaining the draftsman to provide 
legal services has been described as a "gentlemen's agreement" between financial institutions 
and the bar, as "reciprocal back scratching," as a "symbiotic relationship," and, less gener-
ously, as a "conspiracy" between corporate executors and lawyers to exploit the client by 
recommending that the testator name a bank as executor in exchange for assurance that the 
executor, once appointed, will retain the attorney to assist in the probate of the testator's 
estate. 
Id. at 115 (footnotes omitted). 
Although this arrangement appears to give the attorney power over the trustee (because the trustee 
wants to induce the attorney to bring it business), it does not seem beyond the pale to suppose that some 
attorneys engaged in this type of symbiotic relationship might agree to trust terms simply to keep the 
relationship on an even keel. See also Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 644-45 (arguing that "information-
forcing default rule[s]" are justified to remedy informational asymmetries between inexperienced 
settlors and repeat player trust attorneys); see, e.g. , Comm. on Prof'! Ethics & Conduct v. Baker, 492 
N.W.2d 695, 702-04 (Iowa 1992) (reprimanding an attorney for accepting over 100 referrals from a 
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providers has provoked disciplinary sanctions against a number of lawyers.95 
This type of asymmetrical information problem has more serious ramifica-
tions in the trust context than it does in the corporate context because there are 
no market mechanisms to remedy the problem. Unlike the uninformed investor, 
who can free-ride on the efforts of institutional investors, the settlor with 
inadequate information is on her own. The investor who is eventually disap~ 
pointed about how the waiver turned out can cut her losses by selling her shares 
on the open market. Yet the beneficiary has no such exit option. If the waiver 
proves harmful down the road, beneficiaries have no recourse because there is 
no market for their interests. Moreover, beneficiaries may generally be more 
dependent on the trust fund than diversified investors are on a particular 
corporation. The harm the beneficiary suffers is significant, because the trust 
comprises the bulk of his or her wealth. 
The asymmetrical information problem is less likely to exist when the settlor 
chooses as trustee a non-professional associate or family member. In this 
situation, the settlor chooses the trustee, not necessarily for her financial exper-
tise, but because the trustee has a relationship with the settlor and the objects of 
the settlor's bounty, and she can be trusted to make discretionary decisions 
about the beneficiary's respective needs. Individual trustees of this sort are 
unlikely to be trustees of other trusts, are less likely to participate in drafting the 
trust's terms, and are likely to be on a level playing field in terms of sophistica-
tion. 
The second type of information deficit that may cause even the represented 
settlor to agree to a value-decreasing provision involves the settlor's imperfect 
foresight. A waiver's effects may be felt far in the future, generations past the 
settlor's death. Given the long duration of many trusts, a settlor cannot antici-
pate the circumstances that might lead a trustee to depart from ordinary fidu-
ciary duties.96 Moreover, in agreeing to a waiver, a settlor may assume that the 
fiduciary will act in accordance with its past practice and reputation, failing to 
financial services company establishing living trusts and failing to advise clients in a disinterested 
fashion). 
95 . See, e.g., State v. Laden, 893 P.2d 771, 772 (Colo. 1995) (publicly censuring an attorney for 
aiding a trust marketer in the unauthorized practice of law by issuing standard form advice letters in 
response to the trust marketer's clients' requests for legal advice); Comm. on Prof') Ethics v. Matias, 
521 N.W.2d 704, 706--07 (Iowa 1994) (lawyer's license suspended for accepting referrals from a 
company that marketed living trusts); In re Mid-America Living Trust Assocs. , 927 S.W.2d 855, 871 
(Mo. 1996) (enjoining a living trust company, which sold living trust kits to clients and recommended 
attorneys to those clients, from doing business in Missouri); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Kathman, 748 
N.E.2d 1091, 1097 (Ohio 2001) (suspending an attorney from practicing law for aiding a trust marketer 
in the unauthorized practice of law and failing to render meaningful legal advice to the trust marketer's 
customers). 
96. See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note 51, at 1464--65 (elaborating on 
John Stuart Mill's argument that long-term contracts should be subject to judicial intervention by citing 
evidence that parties tend routinely to underestimate future risk and fail to see distant contingencies). 
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consider how the waiver will change the trustee's future behavior.97 
Although the foresight problem exists in the corporate context as well, it is 
much more troubling in the trust context. Unlike the investor, who must 
speculate only about events that will occur during her lifetime, the settlor has a 
much longer time horizon; thus her estimations are even less likely to be 
accurate. 
In the corporate context, some scholars have suggested that courts should not 
enforce broad waivers of basic duties because they provide strong evidence that 
the parties possessed asymmetrical information about the existence and mean-
ing of the waiver provision.98 In particular, John Coffee argues that the specific-
ity of the waiver is critical to determining the severity of the foresight problem. 
An investor is likely to understand a specific and narrowly tailored waiver, 
because it will be able to predict with some certainty how that waiver will be 
interpreted in the future. 99 Thus, the waiver provision is more likely to be 
reflected in the stock price, which goes a long way toward curing the informa-
tion problem faced by uninformed investors. 100 Broad waivers, on the other 
hand, are not likely to be priced accurately, in part because investors cannot 
determine how the waiver will play out, and in part because investors may 
mistakenly rely on the fiduciary's past behavior in calculating the waiver's 
likely future effects (a mistake, because the waiver itself may change the 
fiduciary's behavior). 101 Coffee's insight is even more pertinent to the trust 
arrangement, where the settlor has only his own estimation on which to rely. 
C. FIDUCIARY DUTY WAIVERS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND EXTERNAL COSTS 
So far, the analysis has assumed that fiduciary duty waivers affect only the 
parties to the trust document. If that were true, then parties should be able to 
waive or modify trustees' fiduciary duties so long as both parties have full 
information about the waiver's existence, meaning, and potential future effects. 
97. See Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 51, at 1677 (citing Thompson and others) 
("[T]he process of contracting about a long-term business relationship in which one party must place 
trust and confidence in another makes it difficult to explore the 'downside' possibilities that such party 
will be defrauded."); see also Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note 51, at 1465--66 
& n.16 (noting that, in the context of the close corporation, "[i]t is almost impossible to deal adequately 
with this potential for ex post opportunism by ex ante contracting"). 
98. See Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 51 , at 1668-72 (arguing that only those 
waivers that are "transaction specific" are likely to be adequately priced); Frankel, supra note 5, at 1237 
(stating that "a broad waiver of duties is bound to be uninformed and speculative"). 
99. See Coffee, supra note 51, at 1623, 1668 (arguing that "transaction specificity" is an answer to 
the pricing problem). 
I 00. Id. at 1665--66. 
IOI. Id. at 1668; see also id. at 1624 (arguing that "waivers that give broad powers to management 
to deviate from ways that market forces or moral standards would usually constrain" will not be 
accurately priced); Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition, supra note 5, at 249-50 (arguing that the duty of 
loyalty should not be waivable because beneficiaries of that duty lack the cognition to anticipate the 
circumstances in which and degree to which managers might gain the incentive to take advantage of the 
waiver). 
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But in fact, introducing variation into fiduciary duty law can create external 
costs that reduce value for all trusts. 102 Interference with freedom of contract 
may be justified when necessary to limit external costs. Professors Merrill and 
Smith argue that property law severely limits the variety of property interests 
that parties may create in order to minimize costs to third parties. 103 Professors 
Hansmann and Mattei show how certain mandatory trust rules minimize costs 
for creditors and third parties who must deal with the trustee. 104 
Viewing trustees' fiduciary duties simply as optional default rules would 
produce two distinct types of external effects. First, fiduciary duty law supports 
and reinforces social norms that require trustees to act with care and to refrain 
from self-dealing. Characterizing fiduciary duties as optional strips fiduciary 
duties of moral force and would, over time, weaken the social norms embodied 
in those duties. The end result would be a decline in the value of the trust 
mechanism, not merely for settlors and beneficiaries whose trusts include 
waiver provisions, but also for settlors and beneficiaries who seek to retain 
traditional fiduciary protections. 
Second, if parties increasingly vary fiduciary terms, there will, over time, be 
less consensus about the meaning and content of fiduciary terms. Parties that 
cannot anticipate all potential agency cost problems rely on fiduciary duties as a 
substitute for express contract provisions. Fiduciary duties reduce the cost of 
contracting precisely because there is a common consensus about the meaning 
and scope of the core fiduciary principles. Professors Jeffrey Gordon and 
Melvin Eisenberg, coming at the issue from radically different perspectives, 
both conclude that law is a public good, and erosion of fiduciary standards 
would reduce the value of that public good. 105 Treating fiduciary duties as freely 
modifiable will, by introducing uncertainty into fiduciary law, increase the costs 
of contracting and litigation for all, and will consequently devalue beneficiaries' 
interests by increasing agency costs. After the dust clears, settlors who want to 
provide their beneficiaries with fiduciary protections will have to contract with 
greater specificity to anticipate future conflict (the very problem that fiduciary 
duties currently solve). Fiduciary duties will lose value as mechanisms for 
minimizing agency costs. 
102. But see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 22-25 (arguing that corporate contracts do not 
produce externalities that justify the imposition of mandatory terms). 
103. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, I 10 YALE L.J. I , 25-34 (2000) [hereinafter Merrell & Smith, The 
Numerus Clausus Principle]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 
IOI CoLUM. L. REv. 773 (2001); see also Gordon, supra note 63, at 1568-70 (exploring the extent to 
which concerns for negative externalities justify having mandatory legal rules in the corporate context). 
104. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 9, at 451-67 (arguing that mandatory trust laws are 
justifiable, because they define property rights between the parties to the trust and third parties whose 
rights cannot be protected by contract). 
105. See Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note 5 I, at 1278; Gordon, supra note 63, at 1555. 
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1. Fiduciary Duties and Efficient Social Norms 
To the extent that fiduciary standards embody social or moral norms, deterio-
ration in a common understanding of their meaning will cause a corresponding 
loss in their proscriptive force. This point, advanced by corporate scholars, has 
been largely ignored in the trust literature and bears emphasis. Erosion of 
fiduciary terms would dilute the stigma attached to behavior that transgresses 
fiduciary standards, and it would therefore increase opportunistic behavior by 
even those fiduciaries who have not obtained waivers of particular duties. 106 
Melvin Eisenberg and Robert Hillman both have argued that fiduciary duties are 
social norms that are more effective in shaping behavior than simple legal rules 
would be. 107 Although Eisenberg casts his point as part of a larger counterattack 
on the contractarian account of fiduciary duties, 108 his insights are particularly 
useful for exploring the extent to which fiduciary terms ought to be waivable. 
Eisenberg's argument draws on the work of Robert Cooter and economist 
Kaushik Basu to posit that fiduciary duties are more than simply legal rules. 109 
They are "obligational norms"-that is, norms of behavior that are sufficiently 
ingrained in the culture that violation of the norm will incite self-censure or the 
106. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 
2029-30 (1996) (explaining that "[n]orms solve . .. problems by imposing social sanctions on defec-
tors. When defection violates norms, defectors will probably feel shame, an important motivational 
force"). 
107. Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note 51 , at 1265-79; Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners As 
Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of the Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 51, 72-73 (2000) 
(recognizing that fiduciary standards embody business norms, and that "[s]ome business partners may 
be restrained only by a fear of penalties imposed for misconduct, but a greater number of partners 
operate under self-imposed standards of behavior grounded in a broader ethic than legal duties"). 
108. Eisenberg is one of the leading scholars who argues against a conception of fiduciary duties as 
contractual. See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note 51 , at 1487 ("The corpora-
tion is not a nexus of contracts but an enterprise organized by rules."). According to Eisenberg, because 
of the large number of managerial and non-managerial agents in a public corporation, "most of the 
constitutive rules of . . . corporations are determined not by contract, but by law or by private 
bureaucratic rulemaking." Id. at 1471. He further notes that while many constitutive rules are subject to 
private ordering, the most important ones are mandatory. While contractarians generally view private 
ordering as contractual, and hence mandatory rules as anticontractarian, Eisenberg argues that not all 
modifiable duties are contractual in nature. He explains: 
[T]hat a right or duty may be limited by agreement does not make the right or duty 
contractual. For example, a general duty to exercise reasonable care can be contracted around, 
within certain limits, but that does not make the law of negligence contractual. Similarly, a 
right to a jury trial can be waived, but that does not make the Sixth Amendment contractual. 
Nor is a right or duty contractual because it is imposed on the basis of what courts or 
legislatures believe the parties would want to do if they had addressed the issue. Since it is 
impossible to determine what terms actors with unknown preferences and potentially different 
bargaining power would actually agree upon, rules that purport to be based on hypothetical 
bargains are actually based on collective action. 
Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note 51, at 1274-75. 
109. Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note 51 , at 1258--63. Robert Cooter's work focuses on an 
actor 's internal beliefs causing adherence to social norms. Kaushik Basu theorizes that "obligational 
norms" prevent us from violating social norms regardless of any personal utility that might result. See 
infra note 112. 
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judgment of others.110 Eisenberg argues that many obligational norms are 
internalized. Internalized norms comprise an aspect of individual character, and 
individuals will honor it reflexively, even if doing so causes them to forgo 
material gain. 111 Norms can change, however. If at some point a sufficient 
number of people believe that others are violating the norm, the norm reaches a 
"tipping point" and loses its obligational force. 112 
It follows that if fiduciary duties were entirely optional, the normative 
proscriptions against slacking and self-dealing would begin to unravel. 113 If 
fiduciaries come to believe that other fiduciaries routinely violate the social 
norm, fewer fiduciaries will internalize those norms, and instead will engage in 
a cost-benefit analysis when considering whether to behave opportunistically. 114 
If the meaning of the standard term has eroded sufficiently to decrease a 
shareholder's incentive to bring lawsuits, this may tip the balance toward 
110. Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note 51, at 1257 (explaining obligational norms); id. at 
1265--66 (explaining that fiduciary duties are obligational norms). Eisenberg divides social norms into 
three categories: (I) behavioral patterns "that neither entail a sense of obligation nor are self-
consciously adhered to or engaged in"; (2) practices that are "self-consciously engaged in but do not 
involve a sense of obligation"; and (3) obligational norms, which are "rules or practices that actors not 
only self-consciously adhere to or engage in, but feel obliged in some sense to adhere to or engage in." 
Id. at 1256-57. Eisenberg explains that moral norms are one type of obligational norm. Id. at 1257. 
111. Id. 
112. Eisenberg explains that: 
Tipping occurs when the success of a social activity depends on the formation of a critical 
mass, and enough actors sign on or off that the activity succeeds or fails .... A consequence 
of critical-mass and tipping phenomena is that the behavior of a relatively small number of 
actors can cause an activity to succeed or fail , because a tipping-point may be crossed as a 
result of the addition or subtraction of a small number of actors. 
Id. at 1264. 
When an obligational norm is not internalized, individuals considering whether to violate the norm 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis weighing the benefits of violation against the possible sanctions. Id. at 
1257-58. Eisenberg quotes economist Kaushik Basu: 
Certain norms stop us from doing certain things or choosing certain options, irrespective of 
how much utility that thing or option gives us. Thus most individuals would not consider 
picking another person's wallet in a crowded bus. This they would do not by speculating about 
the amount the wallet is likely to contain, the chances of getting caught, the severity of the law 
and so on, but because they consider stealing wallets as something that is simply not done. 
Id. at 1258 (quoting Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in 3 NEW PALGRAVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND EcONOMICS 476, 477 (1998)). 
I 13. See Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 106, at 2025-26 (arguing that the way in which a legal rule is 
framed can influence social norms). Eisenberg argues that corporate directors' compliance with the duty 
of care is driven by a desire to comply with social norms, and not by fear of liability. Eisenberg, Social 
Norms, supra note 51, at 1265. Acknowledging that social norms can be inefficient, Eisenberg does not 
argue the Jaw should blindly support all social norms. Id. at 1271 . He does, however, make the case that 
fiduciary duties, particularly the duty of loyalty, are efficient norms, and argues that the law does and 
should support those norms. Id. at 1271-76. As for the duty of loyalty, he argues that compliance is 
induced both by the desire to comply with norms and by fear of liability. Id. at 1265--66. 
114. Because the norms are efficient, the law serves an important expressive function in supporting 
and enforcing these norms, which ultimately encourages future compliance. See Eisenberg, Social 
Norms, supra note 51, at 1265-77. 
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opportunistic behavior. 115 
In the corporate context, the problem will be mitigated by market forces. In 
particular, a powerful information market exerts pressure on the corporate 
manager to exercise care and loyalty. The system is backed up by a rigorous 
regulatory scheme that threatens prosecution and jail time to corporate fiducia-
ries who commit egregious breaches of the duty of loyalty. 
The insight that the deterioration of a fiduciary standard may create external 
costs by diluting social norms is, for two reasons, more powerful in the trust 
context. First, trustees are not subject to the same market discipline and government 
enforcement mechanisms as corporate officers and directors. 116 Second, trust 
beneficiaries are typically less diversified than corporate shareholders. 
Because trustees are not subject to market discipline (in particular, informa-
tion markets and share price), they are more likely to include waivers of 
fiduciary duties. Because of information asymmetries, settlors and beneficiaries 
are unlikely to understand the meaning and future impact of these waivers. 117 
As a result, deviation will be more frequent, and deterioration of standards will 
be faster, than in the corporate context. At the same time, the absence of market 
discipline and rigorous enforcement of regulations makes it more likely that 
trustees, unfettered by strict fiduciary duties, will engage in behavior that is not 
value-enhancing. Because the trustee does not face a powerful information 
market that monitors managerial negligence and disloyalty, 118 the only forces 
that keep the trustee from pushing the limits of appropriate behavior are 
conscience and the prospect of litigation by beneficiaries (who are poorly 
positioned to detect opportunistic behavior). 
Compounding the problem is the beneficiaries' lack of diversification and 
inability to exit. 119 If the proscriptive force of the fiduciary norm erodes and 
opportunistic behavior by trustees increases, the resulting harm to beneficiaries 
will generally be greater than the harm to shareholders. 
2. Fiduciary Duties as a Public Good 
If law is a public good, then cases that define the scope of standard terms, 
such as fiduciary duties, produce public benefits. 120 Yet if standard terms are 
freely modifiable, then contracting parties might increasingly attempt to deviate 
from them. As Gordon points out, market constraints limit the incentive for 
115. Robert W. Hillman argues that indeterminate standards may motivate some fiduciaries to 
engage in opportunistic behavior. See Hillman, supra note 107, at 59-{iQ, 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 63-80. 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 88-101. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 102-15. 
119. Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 657 (pointing out that trust law "assumes that the beneficiaries are not 
diversified, so the trustee 's default duty of care is set at the more restrictive reasonable person 
standard"). 
120. See Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note 51, at 1278 (arguing that "shareholder suits [for 
breach of the duty of loyalty], whatever their short-term purpose and result, have the long-term result of 
creating an extremely valuable public good"). 
L 
-
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corporations to deviate from standard terms to the extent that deviations reduce 
share price. 121 Yet some corporations will find that deviation adds value, and 
over time significant numbers of corporations may deviate from standard terms.122 
If so, those standard terms will less often be the subject of litigation, and their 
meaning will erode. 123 Litigation will become more costly and settlement less 
likely. 124 The end result will be an increase in transaction costs because 
contractors will be unable to rely on a common understanding of the standard 
term and will instead have to articulate more terms with precision. 125 
The concern that deterioration of a standard term will result in increased 
transaction costs for all should be, for two reasons, especially intense when that 
standard term is a fiduciary duty. First, if fiduciary duties exist precisely because 
the parties cannot adequately anticipate future agency costs, erosion of the 
common understanding of the meaning and scope of fiduciary duties will be 
costly indeed. Settlors may simply be unable to contract with any degree of 
certainty. 
This point has considerable force in the trust context. Fiduciary duties draw 
brighter lines here as compared to corporate or partnership law, and these 
brighter lines help parties contract with efficiency. For example, until quite 
recently it was widely understood that the duty of loyalty prohibited trustees 
from using their position to profit personally. 126 The rule was clear: if the trustee 
transacts business with the trust in its personal capacity, the trustee has breached 
its duty of loyalty to the trust, even if the beneficiaries could prove no damage 
as the result of the trustee's decision to sit on both sides of the table. 127 Did the 
trustee buy trust property? Breach. 128 Did the trustee sell assets to the trust? 
Breach. 129 Did the trustee learn of an opportunity because of its role as trustee 
121. Gordon, supra note 63, at 1567-68. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1566-71 (describing how deviation from standard terms may lead "to disintegration of 
the standard form"). 
124. Id. at 1566-67. Robert Hillman has argued that vague standards-considered together with the 
costs of bringing litigation to enforce fiduciary duties (the costs may include the irreparable fracturing 
of the fiduciary relationship) and the inability to recoup litigation costs unless damages are substantial-
will deter many lawsuits. See Hillman, supra note 107, at 60-61. 
125. See Gordon, supra note 63, at 1565- 70; see also Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra 
note 51, at 1677 (noting that deviation from standard terms "can impose costs on third parties, which 
ultimately will be spread throughout society"). 
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 170(1) cmt. a (1959). The most recent preliminary draft of 
the Restatement (Third) affirms the Restatement (Second)'s approach to the duty of loyalty in the main, 
but recognizes (and thus seems to validate) a troubling new loophole for institutional trustees that 
threatens to undermine the duty of loyalty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) cmt. d 
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (affirming the duty of loyalty generally); id. cmt. c(8) (noting that state 
statutes allow institutional trustees to invest trust assets in proprietary mutual funds). 
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 78(1) cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF ThUSTS § 170( I ) cmt. c (1959). 
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ThusTs § 78(1) cmts. b & d (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 170(1) cmts. b, e &j (1959). 
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRusTs § 170( I) cmt. h ( 1959). 
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and take personal advantage of that opportunity? Breach. 130 The settlor, in 
entering into a trust arrangement, did not need to envision every possible way in 
which the trustee could profit from its position as trustee and negotiate for 
contract provisions to preclude every instance of self-dealing. Instead, the 
settlor could rely on the well-established understanding of the meaning and 
scope of the duty. A settled understanding of the term reduced transaction costs. 
Now, conceptualize fiduciary duties as optional. If professional trustees begin 
to deviate from standard fiduciary duties by inserting waivers in trust docu-
ments, this deviation will reduce the number of cases articulating the scope of 
fiduciary duty. At the same time, deviation increases the number of cases 
approving fiduciary conduct that would previously have constituted breach. 
Taken together, these factors increase the uncertainty facing a beneficiary whose 
trustee has violated traditional fiduciary standards. This increased uncertainty 
continues the downward spiral; the value of potential litigation declines, result-
ing in still fewer lawsuits and further degradation of the fiduciary standard. The 
result is that future settlors who wish to control trustees' future behavior must 
take greater care to specify duties by contract. No longer can they rely on 
off-the-rack fiduciary standards. Thus, in trust law, clearly defined, plainly 
understood duties play an important role in minimizing transaction costs. 
In sum, when fiduciary standards embody commonly accepted and under-
stood social norms, transaction costs are minimized. Viewing fiduciary stan-
dards as freely waivable default terms will increase the cost of contracting and 
increase litigation uncertainty. 
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS 
Even if waivers maximize value for the immediate parties to the trust 
agreement, they increase costs for other settlors and beneficiaries, present and 
potential. The significant external costs that freely mutable fiduciary rules 
would impose provide justification for limiting parties' ability to modify them. 
None of this is to suggest that all customization of trust terms should be 
prohibited. As Professors Merrill and Smith observe of property rules more 
generally, trust law should reach a balance between the efficiency gains gener-
ated by free contract and the losses that result from external costs associated 
with free contract. 131 In particular, limited modifications that enhance trust 
value but are unlikely to significantly erode the force of the social norm or the 
general understanding about the meaning and effect of the broader duty might 
be justifiable. For example, the law might sanction a limited waiver of the duty 
of care, offered by the settlor to induce the trustee to accept risky investments as 
trust property, if that waiver is limited to liability for a decrease in value of 
those risky investments. 132 This small exception to the duty of care is unlikely 
130. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 170(1) cmt. k (1959). 
131. See Merrill & Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle, supra note 103, at 25- 34. 
132. See infra text accompanying notes 167--68 
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to create uncertainty about the meaning of the duty of care, nor is it likely to 
dilute the social norm of trust. On the other hand, broad exculpatory clauses that 
insulate an institutional trustee from liability for all breaches of the duty of care 
could be viewed as too likely to create significant external effects to be justified. 
To take another example, a carefully drawn limited waiver absolving the trustee 
from liability for purchasing close corporation stock on behalf of the close 
corporation of which he is a director would be unlikely to induce confusion 
about the scope of the duty of loyalty as a whole, nor would it erode the general 
prohibition on self-dealing. 133 Wholesale authorization of the trustee's purchase 
of assets from which it receives a commission would, however, blur the 
common understanding of the duty, introduce uncertainty, and weaken the 
social norm's proscriptive force. 
Thus, consideration of both the asymmetrical information problem and the 
externalities problem leads to the conclusion that courts should generally en-
force narrowly drawn waivers that seek to limit only one aspect of a particular 
duty. On the other hand, courts should not routinely enforce broad waivers, 
particularly when the trustee is an institution. 134 Parts III.A and 111.B explore 
these themes with respect to the two most basic duties of trust law: the duty of 
care and the duty of loyalty. 
A. THE DUTY OF CARE 
Across many kinds of agency relationships, the fiduciary duty of care re-
quires the agent to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the principal's 
business. 135 In the corporate arena, duty is tempered by the notion that corpo-
rate managers should not generally be vulnerable to allegations of negligent 
behavior. The business judgment rule, which can be found in the case law as 
early as the mid-nineteenth century, 136 redefines the corporate duty of care, 
creating a presumption that management's decisions are informed and moti-
vated by a good faith belief that the decision serves the corporation's best 
interests. 137 That presumption can be overcome only by a showing that manage-
ment's behavior rose to a level of gross negligence. 138 There is a clear sense in 
corporate law that holding management or directors liable for actions that can 
133. See infra text accompanying notes 217-18. 
134. Cf Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 51, at 1668-69 (noting in the corporate 
context the distinction between general and transaction-specific waivers, and arguing that parties are 
better able to account in advance for the impact of transaction-specific waivers). 
135. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 432-34, for a 
catalogue of agency relationships and their associated fiduciary duties. 
136. See Smith v. Prattville Mfg. , 29 Ala. 503 (1857); Hodges v. New Eng. Screw Co., I R.I. 312 
(1850); Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847); Percy v. Millaudon, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 616 (La. 1828). 
137. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ('The rule itself ' is a presumption 
that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."') (quoting 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
138. Id. at 873. 
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be construed as simply negligent is a troubling policy. 139 
There is no comparable sense in trust law. Courts adjudicating cases alleging 
breach of the duty of care never developed a doctrine analogous to the business 
judgment rule.140 In fact, they tended to construe exculpatory clauses strictly; 
cases finding a trustee liable notwithstanding the trust document's exculpatory 
clause were the rule rather than the exception. 141 In the last twenty years, as 
corporate literature has popularized the characterization of the duty of care as a 
mere default term, legislatures have enacted provisions expressly authorizing 
exculpatory clauses in trust instruments. 142 Uniform Trust Code section 1008 
follows the lead of those legislatures by authorizing parties to insert exculpatory 
clauses in trust documents, subject to certain limitations. 143 
139. Indeed, the idea that management should be insulated from liability for breach of the duty of 
care is so strong that legislators have reinforced it when they perceived the judiciary weakening it. In 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, decided in 1985, the court held that management could be found liable for 
breaching its duty of care, because its decisionmaking process was shoddy. Id. at 892-93. The Smith 
court viewed management's decisionmaking behavior as rising to the level of gross negligence and 
determined that its actions did not earn the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. at 881 . 
Notwithstanding the court's characterization of management's actions as grossly negligent, the decision 
created widespread alarm, because it seemed to weaken the business judgment rule. In no time, the 
Delaware legislature passed a statute authorizing corporations to offer charter terms to limit liability for 
breach of the duty of care. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004). 
140. See, e.g., In re Newhoff, 486 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958, 963 (App. Div. 1985) (stating that "the 
primary objective of a trustee should be preservation of the trust rather than enrichment of the 
beneficiary" and holding the trustee liable for ri sky investments); see also Sitkoff, supra note 45, at 
574-76 (arguing that a trustee 's stricter duty of care effectuates the aversion to ri sk that seniors and 
beneficiaries generally prefer, whereas the business judgment rule encourages greater levels of risk-
taking that most shareholders seek) . 
141. See supra note 42. 
142. Such jurisdictions include, but are not limited to: ALASKA STAT. § 13.36. 192 (2004) (provision 
enacted 1985); Cow. REV. STAT. § 15-1-305 (2003) (provision enacted 1997); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 
3586 (2001) (provision enacted 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-194 (1997) (provision enacted 1991 ); 
HAW. REv. STAT. § 554C-I (Supp. 2004) (provision enacted 1997); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 68-501 (1999) 
(provision enacted 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3.5-1 (West Supp. 2005) (provision enacted 1999); 
lowA CODE § 633.4505 (2001) (provision enacted 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a01 (Supp. 2004) 
(provision enacted 2000); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 386.710 (West 2004) (provision enacted 1995); ME. 
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7-302 (1998 & Supp. 2004) (provision enacted 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 203C, § 2 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005) (provision enacted 1998); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 469.901 
(2000 & Supp. 2004) (provision enacted 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-512 (2004) (enacted 1989); 
NEB. REV. STAT§ 30-3883 (1997 & Supp. 2004) (provision enacted 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 36A-161 
(2003) (provision enacted 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.61 (West Supp. 2005) (provision 
enacted 1995); OR. REv. STAT.§ 128.194 (2003) (provision enacted 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 18-15-1 
(2003) (provision enacted 1996); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 62-7-302 (1987 & Supp. 2004) (provision enacted 
1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-103 (Supp. 2004) (provision enacted 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
75-7-302 (1993 & Supp. 2005) (provision enacted 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit . 9, § 4651 (Supp. 2004) 
(provision enacted 1997); VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-45.3 (2004) (provision enacted 2000); WASH. REv. CODE 
ANN.§ 11.100.010 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005) (provision enacted 1995); W. VA. CODE§ 44-6C-I (2004) 
(provision enacted 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 881.02 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (provision enacted 
2002); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 4-10-901 (2005) (provision enacted 2003). 
143. Specifically, UTC section 1008(a)(l) does not validate trust provisions that shield trustees from 
liability for acts "committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the 
interests of the beneficiaries." Section 1008(a)(2) authorizes courts to invalidate clauses that were 
inserted as a result of an abuse of a confidential relationship between the trustee and settlor. 
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Although there is an extensive literature exploring the issue of limiting 
liability for corporate management, relatively little scholarship has addressed 
whether and to what extent trustees ought to receive comparable protection. 
After analyzing the justifications for immunizing corporate management from 
liability for negligent acts, this section then considers the appropriate treatment 
of trust provisions purporting to exculpate trustees from liability for negligent 
behavior. 
1. The Duty of Care and Corporate Directors 
Professors Fischel and Easterbrook argue that protecting directors from 
liability from breach of the duty of care maximizes shareholder value, because 
the costs of the duty of care outweigh its benefits, and because liability rules are 
an ineffective mechanism for adjudicating shareholder-management disputes on 
this issue. 
First, they argue that because management faces strong market pressures to 
exercise reasonable care, a legal rule requiring management to do so is superflu-
ous. 144 Managers are repeat players; they continuously need to raise capital. 145 
Moreover, management's wealth is tied to its performance, and its performance 
is judged by share price and its success in the capital markets. 146 Poor managers 
will have a hard time obtaining other comparable management positions if they 
are fired. 147 Finally, corporate investments in human capital create pressure. 148 
In sum, because the market will discipline poor managers, management will 
perform reasonably regardless of whether failure to do so will result in liability. 
On the other hand, they argue, management gains little from breaching the 
duty of care. 149 Consequently, "[a]s the present value of forgone compensation 
in future periods increases relative to the current gains from poor performance, 
liability rules become less important." 150 Moreover, they argue, courts are in a 
poor position to evaluate management's performance because business deci-
sions involve a multitude of factors, including knowledge of the particular 
business, market, and institution. 151 Managers must often act quickly in the face 
of market pressures, without time to deliberate. 152 A decision that turned out 
144. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 94-102. 
145. Id. at 95. 
146. Id. at 96-97. 
147. Id. at 95. 
148. To wit, " (c]orporate managers frequently possess expertise and skills specialized to a firm. 
Changing managers is costly because the replacements lack equivalent firm-specific expertise-<:ostly 
to managers, too, because they must acquire specific capital to be useful elsewhere. Both sides try to 
avoid these costs, the threat of which induces both to perform well in the first place." Id. at 97. 
149. See id. at 95. 
150. Id. at 95-96. 
151. "What looks like a hasty decision by corporate managers may simply reflect experience or an 
effort to avoid the expense of hiring outside experts." Id. at 102; see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 
898 (2d Cir. 1982) (Cardamone, J., dissenting). 
152. "Businesses rarely encounter 'sure things.' Often managers must act now and learn later; delay 
for more study may be the worst decision .... " EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 98-99. 
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poorly might have been the right decision nonetheless. As Fischel and Easter-
brook put it, the "[c]osts of decision ex post will be highest precisely when it 
was also most difficult to contract ex ante." 153 Furthermore, most agency costs 
are attributable to a "lack of gumption,"154 but in a situation where decisions are 
usually made by committee, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to 
determine the extent and character of each parties' contribution, or lack thereof. 
In the rare case where those forces prove inadequate to induce management to 
behave reasonably, "ex post settling up in markets" is a disciplinary tool 
superior to judicial intervention. 155 
While a rule requiring management to exercise reasonable care adds little 
value, it creates significant costs. First, it makes management unduly vulnerable 
to derivative suits, which consume significant corporate resources. 156 Yet plain-
tiffs and their attorneys may have little reason to consider the corporation's 
costs when determining whether to sue. The smaller the shareholder's interest, 
the greater her incentive to sue, because the cost of the suit to the plaintiff/ 
shareholder may be small in comparison to the potential reward. Shareholders 
with small stakes will bear little of the cost of the litigation, and they have no 
incentive to consider the cost the litigation will create for other shareholders. 157 
Attorneys considering whether to pursue a derivative suit will consider only the 
likely compensation, but not the cost to the corporation. 158 A rule limiting 
management's liability to acts that are at least grossly negligent arguably 
minimizes frivolous derivative suits. 
A second cost of a rule that requires exercise of reasonable care is that it 
reinforces management's risk-averse nature. Shareholders who are diversi-
fied might wish to increase management's tolerance for risk. Easterbrook and 
Fischel argue that a rule that absolves management from liability for risks taken 
in good faith might enhance shareholder wealth by increasing profit while 
allowing shareholders to pay less in compensation and insurance. 159 
From the business judgment rule, it is a small step to conclude that statutes 
authorizing management to offer charter terms that shield them from liability 
for breach of the duty of care make some sense. To the extent that an exculpa-
tory clause simply reaffirms the standard business judgment rule, there is little 
need to worry that shareholders may be disadvantaged by the clause, even if 
they are unaware of its existence. If the clause affords management greater 
protection than the business judgment rule would (because it could be construed 
to protect even actions that could be characterized as grossly negligent), share 




157. "A dominating characteristic of the derivative action is the lack of any link between stake and 
reward-not only on the judge's part but also on the plaintiff's." Id. 
158. Id. at IO I. 
159. Id. at 99-100. 
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price-which reflects the cost of disadvantageous terms-arguably protects the 
uninformed investor. 160 
2. The Duty of Care and the Trustee 
a. The Absence of a Business Judgment Rule. Why has trust law not devel-
oped a version of the business judgment rule? First, there are relatively fewer 
market pressures to induce trustees to exercise reasonable care. Trustees need 
not worry about raising money, maintaining or increasing stock prices, or 
responding to hostile takeovers. There is no "share price" or secondary informa-
tion market that informs other potential customers of a trustee's negligent acts. 
In fact, negligence is often hard for a beneficiary to detect. Beneficiaries who 
discover that a trustee is performing poorly will be unlikely to communicate this 
to the trustee's other clients, who remain unknown to them. Although employ-
ees of trust companies may be concerned about the labor market, it influences 
them less than it does their corporate counterparts. Because there is no informa-
tion market that reveals their poor performance, employees may be less con-
cerned about finding a new job if they are terminated. Thus, there is little "ex 
post settling up in markets" 161 when a trustee acts negligently with respect to 
any particular trust account; as long as trustees do not run afoul of regulators, 
there are few market pressures that encourage them to exercise reasonable care. 
When the trustee is an individual professional, the problem is compounded. 
Second, there is no reason to encourage trustees to take risks. 162 The duty of 
care does not hamstring trustees the way it arguably does corporate manage-
ment.163 The exercise of reasonable, cautious judgment is the very essence of 
the trustee's job. 
Moreover, if a beneficiary does allege that the trustee breached the duty of 
care, judges or juries are better equipped to determine whether a trustee's 
action, or lack of action, amounts to negligence. Unlike the corporate environ-
ment, where management must deal daily with a multitude of variables, and 
160. The foresight problem is not significant, because the shareholder makes predictions about 
events that will occur during her lifetime, and because losses suffered as a result of inadequate foresight 
are small. Contractarians have failed to take seriously arguments about the external costs created by 
norm erosion. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 46, at 37-39. Butler and Ribstein dismiss 
extemality arguments made by Coffee. See Coffee, No Exit, supra note 51, at 948-49. 
161. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 99. 
162. Sitkoff, supra note 45, at 574 (noting that "beneficiaries cannot easily diversify, and when one 
cannot diversify the standard economic assumption is that of risk-averseness"). Sitkoff argues that 
relative tolerance for risk explains the difference in the duty of care standard in the corporate and trust 
contexts. Id. at 574-76. 
163. Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman have argued that: 
The duty of care imposes an obligation on the fiduciary to avoid unnecessary risk. However, 
different levels of risk are appropriate in different fiduciary relationships. For example, a 
trustee often is required to be prudent and conservative in managing an asset, whereas a 
director of a start-up company may be encouraged to take risks. 
See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and 
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1062 (1991). 
l 
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quick action on less than full information may be necessary, the business of 
trust management is comparatively straightforward. 164 Trustees ordinarily need 
not make decisions under time pressure, and investment decisions involve 
relatively clear considerations. The trust terms create guidelines to assist the 
trustee (and later, the court) to evaluate whether a particular type of investment 
is sound for a particular trust. Additionally, because there are usually only one 
or two trustees, determining which trustee made the mistake is unlikely to be 
difficult for the factfinder. As a general matter, a liability rule requiring the 
exercise of due care appears well calibrated to constrain trustee misbehavior. 
But will the costs of litigation offset the benefits the rule generates? The 
litigation cost problem is less significant in the trust context compared to the 
corporate context because fewer incentives to frivolous litigation exist. The 
corporate problem of the litigious shareholder who bears little of the cost of 
litigation, and thus has an incentive to bring an action that imposes costs on 
other stakeholders, should be much less pronounced. Because each trust has 
only a few beneficiaries, a litigious beneficiary will bear a significant portion of 
the litigation costs, because if the trustee prevails, litigation expenses will be 
paid out of the trust property. 165 This creates a disincentive to bring a lawsuit, 
unless the case for trustee breach seems strong. Thus the corporate problem of 
frequent litigation of questionable merit is mitigated by the circumstances of the 
trust mechanism. 
In sum, close analysis vindicates the history of trust law, in which trustees are 
held to a high standard of performance. Because the duty of care generates 
value, there has been no judicial trend toward abolishing it or reducing the 
protections it affords. In contrast, in the corporate context the legislative 
sanction of exculpatory provisions is an understandable reaction to judicial 
determinations that make the limits of the duty uncertain. 
b. Exculpatory Clauses. Although the duty of care generally maximizes trust 
value, there are instances in which the settlor would benefit from a provision 
modifying the trustee's common-law duty. Whether these modifications should 
be enforced, however, depends on the existence and scope of information 
164. See Sitkoff, supra note 45, at 577 (noting that "managerial decisions regarding financial assets 
are easier to monitor than decisions regarding operating assets" and that this relative ease justifies legal 
oversight of the trustee). 
165. See, e.g., Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank, 909 F.2d 480, 485 (I I th Cir. 1990). 
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asymmetries, and on the external costs generated by modifying the common-
law duty. 
When the settlor chooses a non-professional trustee, information problems 
are unlikely to be significant. A settlor who chooses a non-professional does so 
because the settlor places a high value on qualities other than professional trust 
management, such as the trustee's knowledge of family dynamics or the benefi-
ciaries' peculiarities. The parties' interests are fairly aligned, and neither is 
likely to possess superior legal knowledge. In such a case, the trustee might lack 
financial expertise. The settlor might not want to see the trustee sued for errors 
in investment decisions, and the fear of potential liability might make the 
potential trustee reluctant to serve, depriving the settlor of the family expertise 
that she seeks. Both settlor and trustee might want an exculpatory clause to give 
the trustee some room to maneuver without fear of liability. Because serious 
information problems are unlikely to exist, and because the waiver enhances 
value for both parties, there is no justification for prohibiting a waiver that 
raises the threshold for liability to gross negligence or recklessness. 
When the settlor chooses a professional trustee, however, the analysis is 
different. Although most settlors (especially those with very high net worth) 
will be well represented by skilled and honest attorneys, the occasional settlor 
may be unrepresented or ill-served by his attorney. In such a case, the parties' 
access to information about the existence, meaning, and future effect of an 
exculpatory clause may be asymmetrical. 166 If there were a need to allow 
professional trustees to insert broad clauses exculpating them from the effects of 
their own negligence, then one might ask whether concerns for those marginally 
few poorly or unrepresented settlors justifies a rule prohibiting broad waivers. 
But, as the following paragraphs develop, there is little justification for allowing 
professional trustees to protect themselves with broad exculpatory clauses; in 
fact, most well-established institutional trustees do not feel the need for broad 
clauses and do not insist on them. Given this circumstance, a rule prohibiting 
professional trustees from hiding behind broad exculpation clauses might be 
justified as necessary to protect those settlors at the margins who lack full 
information. On the other hand, narrowly drawn, transaction-specific waivers 
are unlikely to be the result of information deficits, and courts should generally 
enforce them. 
The externalities concern leads to the same conclusion. Broad unspecific 
waivers have the greatest potential to erode fiduciary norms. Narrowly tailored, 
transaction-specific waivers, however, pose relatively little threat to the vitality 
of fiduciary norms. 
At least three reasons might lead a settlor with full information to consider 
exculpating a professional trustee from liability for breach of the duty of care. 
First, the settlor might fear frivolous litigation by disappointed beneficiaries, 
litigation that will ultimately reduce the value of the trust f~r all beneficiaries. 
166. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101. 
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Second, the settlor may believe that trustee compensation will be less expensive 
if the trustee is not bound by common-law fiduciary duties and their attendant 
risk of litigation. Third, the settlor may face a particular problem or set of 
problems for which fiduciary duties present a sub-optimal solution. For in-
stance, the settlor may desire that the trustee hold assets in trust that the trustee 
is reluctant to accept. 
Consider first the settlor who fears nuisance suits by a particular beneficiary 
(or beneficiaries) with a tendency to behave irrationally. The settlor can easily 
solve this problem with the equivalent of "no contest" clauses commonly 
drafted in wills. A beneficiary who unsuccessfully challenges the trustee's 
exercise of care loses all or part of her beneficial interest in the trust. While 
even this solution might be criticized for its potential to deter meritorious suits, 
at least a no-contest clause preserves some incentive for a trustee to exercise 
reasonable care: the settlor need not saddle all beneficiaries with no-contest 
provisions (so that some of the beneficiaries could enforce the duty without 
risking their interests), and, in at least some cases of clear breach, beneficiaries 
might be willing to take some personal risk to recover from a careless trustee. 
By contrast, a broad exculpatory clause fails completely to separate nuisance 
suits from those involving breach of the duty of care. 
Next, consider the settlor who is willing to include an exculpatory clause to 
lower trustee compensation. The trustee may represent to the settlor that the 
exculpatory clause will reduce its litigation costs, and the trustee's representa-
tions of, and reputation for, trustworthiness may reassure the settlor that the 
trustee will act prudently without threat of litigation. Here, a primary difficulty 
is one of asymmetric information: the settlor may have little understanding of 
the rights she is forfeiting by including an exculpatory clause, nor may she 
understand how much she is saving by forfeiting those rights. One solution 
would be to enforce broad exculpatory clauses, but only if the professional 
trustee formally offers the settlor two prices for two different services: one 
commission for full-service trusteeship, and a lower commission for an agree-
ment that includes an exculpatory clause. 167 At least in this instance a large 
price differential is likely to induce the settlor to obtain independent advice 
about the rights she gives up when she agrees to the exculpatory clause. 
Moreover, requiring the trustee to price the exculpatory clause would discour-
age trustees from routinely insisting on such clauses. 
Finally, consider a settlor who wants to induce the trustee to accept and 
maintain as trust property investments that the trustee would not ordinarily 
consider appropriate trust investments-stock in a closely held corporation or 
some other concern in which the settlor has a personal interest. If a trustee 
167. See Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 51 , at 1623 (stating that "courts should 
uphold opt-out provisions that deviate from traditional fiduciary standards only when they can find that 
the term has been accurately priced"); see also id. at I 667---08 (discussing difficulties with accurate 
pricing). 
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deems the investment too risky, or if the investment falls outside the scope of 
the trustee's investment guidelines for trust investments, the trustee may condi-
tion receipt of the problematic assets on the inclusion of an exculpatory clause 
in the trust document. If the clause is drawn narrowly, so that it relieves the 
trustee from liability only if the problematic assets later decline in value, there 
is no reason to prohibit the waiver. Because the waiver is specific and requested 
or offered as a condition to taking on problematic assets, both sides are likely to 
possess equal information about the clause's existence, scope, and future ef-
fects. 
Suppose now that the settlor and the trustee attempt to solve the same 
problem with a boilerplate exculpatory clause that reads, "the trustee named in 
this instrument shall not be liable for the trustee's acts or failure to act, except 
for willful misconduct or gross neglect." 168 Although the professional trustee 
understands fully the meaning of this provision, the settlor may believe that the 
clause is intended solely to protect the trustee from liability stemming from the 
risky investment. Given the settlor's limited foresight, he may not understand 
that the trustee may later raise the clause as a defense against a beneficiary's 
claim of breach with respect to other actions taken by the trustee. Because of 
asymmetrical information about the meaning of the broadly worded exculpatory 
clause, the fact that the clause exists is not evidence that it is actually wealth-
enhancing. 
Moreover, authorizing broadly worded exculpatory clauses may, in the aggre-
gate, cause significant harmful external effects. As explained previously, broad 
waivers tend to erode the legal understanding of the fiduciary standard, which, 
over time, will increase transaction costs by reducing the parties' ability to rely 
on the standard as a backdrop to the contract. In addition, the erosion of the 
fiduciary norm will weaken its proscriptive force, which may encourage some 
trustees to behave opportunistically, further reducing the value of the trust form. 
In short, none of the reasons that might lead a settlor to include an exculpa-
tory provision in a trust instrument provides a sufficient justification for rou-
tinely enforcing broad exculpatory clauses against institutional trustees. Typically, 
when the settlor faces a problem for which off-the-rack fiduciary duties provide 
a sub-optimal solution, the settlor can resolve the problem with a trust provision 
that is narrowly tailored to achieve the settlor's objective; a broad exculpatory 
clause is not necessary. Only the trustee's representations that a broad exculpa-
tory clause will reduce its litigation costs, and hence the settlor's commissions, 
provide some basis for enforcing broad clauses. But trust provisions drafted 
based on those representations are rife with asymmetric information problems. 
And, beyond those problems, enforcement of exculpatory clauses would gener-
ate external costs not present to the same degree with narrowly tailored provi-
sions. 
168. Drafting California Revocable Living Trusts, CAL. C.E.B. § 16.22 (J. Cohan ed., 4th ed. 2003). 
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The external-costs problem suggests that courts should not enforce broadly 
drafted exculpatory clauses against institutional trustees (allowing non-
professional trustees to invoke them is unlikely to seriously erode the norm). 
But even if courts are willing to ignore those external costs, the analysis 
suggests that they should enforce exculpatory clauses only where there is clear 
evidence that the clause advances some identifiable objective of the settlor, and 
that the settlor possessed full information about the cost and potential impact of 
the clause. 
Statutes that authorize parties to insert broad exculpatory clauses that shield 
professional trustees from liability for failure to exercise reasonable care are 
partially misguided, because they water down the judiciary's role. As John 
Coffee has emphasized, American courts "have invariably played an active and 
indispensable role" in monitoring long-term relational contracts; 169 the Ameri-
can tolerance for contractual freedom has typically been counterbalanced by 
judicial activism in monitoring for opportunism. 170 To the extent that statutes 
propose to weaken this ex post judicial review as a check on opportunistic 
behavior, they pose a danger beyond the one generated by occasional judicial 
enforcement of a broad exculpatory clause. 
c. The Law. The preceding analysis provides a theoretical explanation for the 
approach that many states have taken. For example, New York by statute 
expressly prohibits exculpatory clauses in testamentary trusts. 171 Surrogate 
Court judges (not all of whom are known for being overly sensitive to ethical 
dilemmas) drafted and advocated for the statute, 172 which was enacted in 1936 
over the strong objections of the city and county bar associations. 173 The 
impetus for the statute was the surrogates' urgent sense that exculpatory clauses 
169. Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 51, at 1619. 
170. Id. at 1620--21. 
171. N.Y. EsT. POWERS & ThusTs LAW§ 11-1.7 (McKinney 1967). That section provides: 
(a) The attempted grant to an executor or testamentary trustee, or the successor of either of 
any of the following enumerated powers or immunities is contrary to public policy: 
( 1) The exoneration of such fiduciary from liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, 
diligence and prudence. 
172. According to a letter written by Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman, the bill was drafted by 
Surrogates Wingate, Foley and Delehanty. The Surrogate's Association of New York State approved the 
bill. See Letter from Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman (Apr. 1, 1936) (on file with the library of 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). 
173. The New York County Lawyer's Association recommended that the legislature disapprove the 
bill. See Report of the New York County Lawyers' Association, Committee on State Legislation (Report 
No. 442, Mar. 31 , 1936) (on file with the library of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). 
The Committee on State Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York also 
recommended that the bill be rejected. See Report of the Committee on State Legislation of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York 595-97 (Report No. 257, n.d.) (on file with the library 
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). The New York State Bar Association seems to 
have approved the bill. See Letter from Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman (Apr. 21, 1936) (on file 
with the library of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). 
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were becoming standard in trust forms used by institutional trustees (while 
non-professional trustees never insisted on them), 174 and that settlors who 
signed these trust agreements were insufficiently informed about the existence, 
meaning and likely future consequences of these provisions. 175 One drafter also 
emphasized the failure of settlors' lawyers to cure the information asymmetries: 
[T]he drawing of wills . .. has to perhaps a preponderant extent fallen into the 
hands of lawyers who are either actively engaged in work for these financial 
institutions or hopefully anticipate such retainers. As a result, men who are 
more and more coming to do the work of testamentary draftsmanship, have 
come to view the wills they are called upon to draw from the standpoint of the 
corporate fiduciaries whom they expect to represent, rather than from that of 
the testator and the persons, whether dependents or otherwise, whom he 
desires to benefit. 176 
Although the New York statute does not apply to inter vivos trusts, New York 
174. In a second letter from Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman in support of the legislation, 
which Surrogate Wingate drafted, Surrogate Wingate blasted the New York Bar Association for 
contending that exculpatory clauses were principally necessary to enable testators to give freedom to 
non-professional, family-member trustees: 
The fact of the matter, as demonstrated by my almost twenty years of experience on the bench 
in the county, which by reason of the fact that it has the largest population in the state, does 
the greatest volume of probate business, is that the argument advanced is wholly specious and 
misleading. In all my experience, I cannot recall a single instance in which a testator has given 
such authority (to deviate from the standard of care) to an executor or trustee who was an 
object of his bounty. On the other hand, such clauses are of almost daily occurrence in wills in 
which corporate fiduciaries are named. 
The following clause . .. has appeared, in substance, on so many occasions as to lead to the 
conclusion that it has been adopted as a standard form by the corporate and other professional 
fiduciaries: 'My executor and Trustee shall not be liable for any act of omission or loss in the 
performance of its duties except for willful neglect or misconduct. ' 
Letter from Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman 3-4 (Apr. 21 , 1936) (on file with the library of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York). 
175. Surrogate Wingate argued that "the chief vice [with exculpatory clauses] arises from the fact 
that the average testator neither sees nor understands these clauses nor the effect that they may produce 
among his dependents. He is primarily concerned with the fact that certain dependents are to receive, as 
he believes, certain portions of his property, and is content to leave to the attorney drawing the will the 
administrative portions thereof." Letter from Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman 2 (Apr. I, 1936) 
(on file with the library of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). In another letter, 
Surrogate Wingate argued that testators in the vast majority of cases had not "any remote realization of 
the fact that he was subjecting the property upon which his dependents must look for support, to 
potentially serious jeopardy." Letter from Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman 4 (Apr. 21 , 1936) 
( on file with the library of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). 
176. Letter from Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman I (Apr. 1, 1936) (on file with the library of 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). Surrogate Wingate further argued that "[t]hese 
corporate fiduciaries in too many instances view the entire matter [of drafting a will with a testamentary 
trust provision] not so much as a sacred trust upon which the welfare of the beneficiaries, and indeed, at 
times, their very existence depends, as just another piece of business to be handled in a routine way, 
frequently by underpaid clerks, lacking both experience and sound judgment." Id. 
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courts have continued to resist exculpatory clauses in those trusts. 177 New York 
cases deciding the issue fall into three categories: either the court holds the 
trustee liable on the ground that the acts complained of are outside the scope of 
the protection the exculpatory clause affords; 178 the court finds that the exculpa-
tory clause precludes the beneficiaries' action, because the trustee is still 
accountable to the living settlor; 179 or the court holds that the trustee is not 
liable, because it was not negligent. 180 
Other state courts share New York's reluctance to shield trustees from 
liability for breach of the duty of care. For example, New Jersey courts have 
determined that, as a general matter, an exculpatory clause cannot relieve a 
trustee from liability "where a loss results from negligence in the administration 
of a trust." 181 And the Alabama Supreme Court has held that "although a 
trustee's duties and obligations are governed largely by the trust agreement, that 
agreement cannot be employed to vitiate 'the duty imposed by the "prudent 
person" standard.'" 182 
Although the vast majority of state courts routinely announce that exculpa-
tory clauses are enforceable, 183 in reality, courts tend to shield the trustee from 
177. It is not clear why the drafters of the New York statute did not expressly extend the exculpatory 
clause prohibition to inter vivos trusts. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that the vast majority of 
trusts during this period were testamentary trusts, or because surrogates were less sure that the 
legislature had authority to interfere with the terms of inter vivos instruments, which were not subject to 
judicial supervision. In the first cases to consider whether the statute's prohibition should extend to inter 
vivos trusts, courts held that it should not. See, e.g., In re Cent. Hannover Bank & Trust Co., 26 
N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Early cases holding that exculpatory clauses are enforceable if contained 
in inter vivos trust are better understood as consistent with the rule, which is well established in several 
states, that "while a trust is revocable, the trustee owes duties to the person holding the power to revoke 
and not to the named beneficiaries." CAL. PROB. CooE § 16400 cmt. (West 2004). 
178. See Villard v. Villard, 114 N.E. 789, 794-95 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that a clause purporting to 
shield a trustee from liability for retaining investments originally held by the settlor did not shield the 
trustee from liability for failing to sell investments that it did not know were not part of the settlor's 
estate); In re Rushmore's Estate, 21 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529-30 (Sur. Ct. 1940) (holding that an exculpatory 
clause directing that a trustee would not be held liable "for any act done ... in good faith hereunder" 
did not shield the trustee from liability for "non-legal" investments). 
179. See Bauer v. Bauernschmidt, 589 N.Y.S.2d 582 (App. Div. 1992). 
180. See In re Clark's Will, 177 N.E. 397 (N.Y. 1931). 
181. See Behrman v. Egan, 95 A.2d 599, 601 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953) (citing Liberty Title & 
Trust Co. v. Plews, 60 A.2d 630) (N.J. Ch. 1948)); Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 53 A.2d 225 
(N.J. Ch. 1947), aff'd, 64 A.2d 214 (NJ. 1949); see also Semler v. CoreStates Bank, 693 A.2d 1198, 
1208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding a trustee liable for negligence on the ground that the 
trustee's negligent acts fell outside the scope of protection the exculpatory clause provided). 
182. See First Ala. Bank of Hunstville v. Spragins, 515 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. 1987) (holding that a 
trust provision cannot alter the trustee's duty to use reasonable care in making and managing 
investments). 
183. See Kimball v. New Eng. Trust Co., 14 Conn. Supp. 432, 440 (1947) (stating that "[a]lthough 
courts should not encourage efforts to impair the stringency of the time-honored safeguards with which 
the law has encompassed the fiduciary relation, nevertheless, the acts of this executor-trustee must be 
examined in the light of the 'exculpatory clauses' of this will. This testator has excused, in each 
instance, any loss not due to bad faith or willful default. The court does not understand the appellants to 
claim any bad faith in this case"); In re Trusteeship of Williams, 591 N.W.2d 743, 746-48 (Minn. App. 
1999) (rejecting the beneficiary's argument that enforcement of an exculpatory clause in favor of a 
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liability in only four situations: (1) the trustee exercised reasonable care notwith-
standing the exculpatory clause; 184 (2) the trustee is a non-professional or 
uncompensated; 185 (3) the exculpatory provision relates directly to the settlor's 
direction that the trustee retain specific, relatively risky investments, and the 
beneficiaries seek to hold the trustee liable for their handling of those 
investments; 186 or ( 4) there is other evidence that the settlor possesses full 
information. 187 In cases where the trustee's negligence is apparent, courts often 
find the trustee liable on the ground that the exculpatory clause does not protect 
the trustee from the negligent acts. 188 
3. The Duty of Care and the Uniform Trust Code 
Following the Restatement, Uniform Trust Code section 1008 deems enforce-
able an exculpatory clause relieving the trustee from liability for breach of the 
duty of care. 189 On its face, there is nothing controversial about section 1008. In 
allowing waivers for even those trustee acts that amount to gross negligence, the 
professional trustee was against public policy, but finding that the exculpatory clause did not shield the 
trustee from liability for negligent acts) . 
184. See Kimball, 14 Conn. Supp. at 440; Powell v. Cocowitch, 94 So. 2d 589, 591-92 (Fla. 1957); 
Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust Co., 71 A.2d 184 (N.J. 1950); Bauer v. Bauernschmidt, 589 N.Y.S.2d 582, 
583 (App. Div. 1992) (finding that the trustee acted with the requisite degree of care in taking some of 
the actions that led to the complaint); In re Cowles' Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 160, 173 (App. Div. 1965); 
Spring v. Hawkes, 41 A.2d 538 (Pa. 1945). 
185. See Pearson v. Barr, No. D037414, 2002 WL 1970144 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002). 
186. See Bartlett v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 11 (N.H. 1986) (upholding exculpatory clause). The 
Bartlett court noted that "[i]n this case, the master found that Dumaines 'is a unique trust, having 
features of both a trust and a corporation,' and that [settlor 's] general intent .. . was to authorize his 
Trustees ' in their associated capacity to carry on business ' 'so far as convenient and practicable' under 
the name of 'Dumaines.' It was the settlor 's general intent to give the trustees 'absolute control of trust 
property and trust business.' The master also found that '[s]ince the Dumaines Trustees are to establish 
and carry on businesses, the senior clearly intended that the 'prudent [person] rule' of investment would 
not be applicable.' " Id. at 8; see also Hoffman v. First Va. Bank, 263 S.E.2d 402 (Va. 1980); Perling v. 
Citizens & S. Nat' ! Bank, 300 S.E.2d 649 (Ga. 1983); In re Cowles' Will , 255 N.Y.S .2d 160, 173-74 
(App. Div. 1965). 
187. Farr v. First Camden Nat' ! Bank & Trust Co., 66 A.2d 444,446 (N.J. App. Div. 1949). 
188. See McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002) (considering a trust provision that 
protected a trustee from liability for negligence, and concluding that the trustee was liable for breach of 
trust, because "[a] reasonable construction of these provisions .. . is that the Lois Trustees were 
exculpated for ordinary negligence, but not the duty to (i) inform beneficiaries or (ii) treat them 
impartially"); In re Trusteeship of WiJliams, 591 N.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (uphold-
ing the validity of an exculpatory clause shielding a trustee from liability for errors in judgment, but 
finding that the trustee's failure to sell declining stock for over four years, even though the stock 
comprised the majority of the trust's assets, could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, because the 
failure was possibly negligent rather than "an error in judgment"); Behrman v. Egan, 95 A.2d 599, 60 I 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953) (citing Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 60A.2d 630 (N.J. Ch. 1948)); 
Bauer v. Bauernschmidt, 589 N.Y.S .2d 582, 583 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that an exculpatory clause 
did not protect a trustee from liability for making certain negligent expenditures); Jewett v. Capital 
Nat'! Bank, 618 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that an exculpatory clause relieving a 
trustee of liability for investing in speculative stocks did not shield the trustee from liability for 
negligence in failing to diversify the trust's assets) . 
189. UTC § 1008 provides: 
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model statute echoes the Restatement. 190 The drafters seem to have been 
cognizant of asymmetrical information problems, and the model statute includes 
several attempts to remedy those potential problems. First, by providing for 
limits, albeit minimal, on the permissible scope of the waiver, the drafters 
tacitly acknowledge that some settlors will not be aware of or understand an 
exculpatory clause; otherwise, there would be no reason to flatly prohibit 
waivers of trustee actions that are reckless or in bad faith, because no informed 
settlor would ever agree to such provisions. 191 Second, the model statute places 
the burden of proving that the settlor was informed of the exculpatory clause 
squarely on the trustee who inserts it. If the trustee cannot prove both that the 
clause was "fair" and that the clause's "existence and contents were adequately 
communicated to the settlor," the clause will not be enforced.192 
The comments to the section, however, threaten to gut the protections the 
statutory language provides. First, there is no indication of what proof would be 
sufficient to show that the settlor received adequate disclosure. Do the drafters 
anticipate that the trustee should require the settlor to sign a separate writing 
acknowledging the exculpatory clause? If so, what reason is there to think that a 
settlor would understand the acknowledgment any better than she would under-
stand the clause in the document? It will be the trustee's word against that of a 
(a) A term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is unenforceable to the 
extent that it: 
(l) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with 
reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries; or 
(2) was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship to the settlor. 
(b) An exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted by the trustee is invalid as an abuse of 
a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee proves that the exculpatory term 
is fair under the circumstances and that its existence and contents were adequately 
communicated to the settlor. 
UNtF. TRusT CoDE § 1008 (2000). 
190. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(2) cmt. a (1959) (stating that although strictly con-
strued, exculpatory provisions, absent an abuse in insertion into the trust instrument, relieve the trustee 
of liability for breach of trust unless the breach was committed in "bad faith, intentionally, or with 
reckless indifference to the interests of the beneficiary"). Yet the fact is that most states do not have a 
rule in place that actually results in shielding trustees from liability for gross negligence. California and 
states that have followed its lead have expressly rejected the Restatement's formulation, prohibiting by 
statute exculpatory clauses that purport to relieve the trustee for liability from gross negligence. See, 
e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 16461(b) (West 2004) (providing that " [a] provision in the trust instrument is 
not effective to relieve the trustee of liability (I) for breach of trust committed intentionally, with gross 
negligence, in bad faith , or with reckless indifference to the interest of the beneficiary, or (2) for any 
profit that the trustee derives from a breach of trust") ; MoNT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-512 (2003) (same as 
California). The official comments to section 16461(b) of the California code state that "[t]his section is 
the same in substance as part of Section 222 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1957), except that 
the reference to gross negligence does not appear in the Restatement." 
191. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 1124 (acknowledging that a waiver of a trustee's duty to act in 
good faith "must have been improperly concealed from the settlor or otherwise misunderstood by the 
settlor when propounded"). 
192. UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 1008(b) (2000). 
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dead client; the risk is that courts might accept such a writing in satisfaction of 
the trustee's burden of proof. 
The well-advised trustee, of course, would ensure that the settlor was repre-
sented by counsel. However, it is with respect to this issue that the comments 
are even more troubling: they provide that if the settlor was represented by 
counsel, the settlor's attorney shall be presumed to be the trust instrument's 
drafter, even if the trustee supplied the trust document form! 193 Further, the 
comments create a conclusive presumption that the represented settlor had full 
information regarding the existence and meaning of the exculpatory provi-
sion.194 The comments also provide that the settlor's lawyer's knowledge of the 
clause shall be imputed to the settlor, regardless of whether the attorney actually 
informed the client. 195 
These directives are a marked departure from the traditional judicial ap-
proach. Institutional trustees would no doubt argue that the automatic protection 
that the provision creates is necessary to enable them to rely on the clause. Even 
if the settlor had full information and expressly agreed to the clause, the trustee 
might later find itself under attack from the beneficiaries. Yet the UTC's 
automatic protection rule goes much further than is necessary to respond to this 
concern. A better rule would require trustees to prove that settlor expressly 
agreed to the clause. This would force trustees and attorneys to be candid during 
negotiations. 
Although the UTC drafters recognize that attorneys might overreach when 
motivated by the prospect of financial gain, 196 section 1008 (read together with 
the comments) ultimately fails to protect settlors with unethical or less than 
vigilant attorneys. Although the provision may negatively affect only a small 
fraction of settlors, one wonders why the provision and its comments are 
necessary at all. Responsible trustees and attorneys do not need the benefit of a 
statute that imputes knowledge to their clients, because they will ensure that 
clients have actual knowledge and a fair understanding of any non-standard 
trust terms. Thus, this provision benefits only those attorneys who violate 
ethical obligations to curry favor with institutional trustees. 
193. The comments to section 1008 state that "(t]he requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied if 
the settlor was represented by independent counsel. If the settlor was represented by independent 
counsel, the settlor 's attorney is considered the drafter of the instrument even if the attorney used the 
trustee's form. Because the settlor's attorney is an agent of the settlor, disclosure of an exculpatory term 
to the settlor's attorney is disclosure to the settlor." UNIF. TRUST CoDE § 1008 cmt. (2000); see supra 
note 19. 
194. UN1F. TRusT CODE§ 1008 cmt. (2000). 
195. Id. 
196. Subsection (b) provides that "An exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted by the trustee 
is invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee proves that the 
exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances and that its existence and contents were adequately 
communicated to the settlor." Id. § 1008(b). The comments to subsection (b) indicate that it was 
intended to disapprove of Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), which validated 
an exculpatory clause that was drafted by the settlor's attorney, who was also named as trustee. 
§ 1008(b). 
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As this Article has shown, a broad waiver of the duty of care is against the 
best interests of most settlors who choose professional trustees. Moreover, those 
settlors who would obtain value by reducing the professional trustee's standard 
of care can accomplish their objectives by drafting narrow clauses precisely 
tailored to their objectives. 
The UTC could do a better job of addressing the problem of information 
asymmetries. One possible approach would be to sharply distinguish between 
professional and non-professional trustees, and to allow exculpatory clauses for 
the latter and forbid them for the former (unless the settlor desired a limited 
clause designed to encourage the trustee to take on a risky investment). Or the 
UTC could recommend that professional trustees be held to a higher standard 
than non-professionals. To the extent that section 1008 directs courts to enforce 
most broad exculpatory clauses that protect institutional trustees, it lacks persua-
sive justification. That similar provisions are already in force in many states is 
not in itself a sufficient reason to recommend that other states take the same 
approach. 
Section 1008 is troubling for other reasons: if, in states where the approach to 
exculpatory clauses traditionally has been more grudging, state legislatures 
adopt it, some courts might reasonably construe the act of adoption as a 
directive to depart from the traditional judicial approach to exculpatory clause 
issues. 197 This would work a quiet revolution in a majority of states. If courts 
increasingly uphold broad exculpatory clauses, the fiduciary standard will be-
come fuzzier, reducing its value and weakening the social norm that guides 
fiduciary behavior. The likely result is an increase in transaction costs, not to 
mention the disappointment of expectations held by settlors and beneficiaries. 
B. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
1. The Duty of Loyalty and the Corporation 
Even those who view fiduciary duties as freely waivable default rules do not 
argue that a corporation should be free to insert a blanket waiver of the duty of 
loyalty in the corporate charter. 198 The duty of loyalty, as it is currently applied, 
does not prevent management from functioning efficiently or from benefiting 
shareholders in some other way. In fact, the duty might increase the stability of 
the board or management by discouraging individual actors from breaching 
trust. 199 Insulating directors from liability for all breaches of that duty, there-
fore, would not be expected to generate efficiency gains. Moreover, the poten-
tial gains from breach of the loyalty obligation are significantly greater than the 
gains from breach of the duty of care; thus, the individual director or manager 
197. See Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling Balance, supra note 51, at 1621. 
198. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & F1scttEL, supra note 3, at 103--05 (showing how corporate law allows 
transaction-specific departures from the duty of loyalty, but failing to argue that a blanket duty-of-
loyalty waiver in a corporate charter should be valid). 
199. Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note 51, at 1273-75. 
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faces greater incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior than in negligent 
behavior.200 Finally, the market would be relatively less effective at discourag-
ing breach of the duty of loyalty; defalcations are harder to detect, in part 
because those who behave opportunistically take greater care to cover up their 
behavior, which is therefore less likely to be reflected in the stock price.201 
Individual managers or directors might calculate that the reward justifies the 
risk of getting caught-even if the market threatened to punish some breaches, 
it is a risk worth taking if the payoff is great enough. 202 
Because blanket duty-of-loyalty waivers are unlikely to be wealth enhancing, 
only a sorely unsophisticated and uninformed shareholder would agree to 
one. 203 The asymmetrical information problem thus justifies the mandatory 
character of the duty. 204 At the same time, particular transactions that could be 
characterized as opportunistic would benefit the corporation, and so corporate 
law has developed mechanisms for authorizing or validating those particular 
deals.205 Although the law varies considerably from state to state, some general 
principles are more or less uniform: a director or manager who wishes to engage 
in a self-interested transaction may do so if, after giving full disclosure, she 
obtains the approval of some number of the directors or shareholders (usually a 
majority).206 In theory, at least, this eliminates the information problem and 
allows the corporation to engage in specific transactions that increase share-
200. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 103. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Melvin Eisenberg argues that research exploring human cognitive abilities suggests that the 
duty of loyalty should never be completely waivable. See Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition, supra note 5, 
at 249. He explains: 
To begin with, because of bounded rationality the beneficiaries could not possibly identify all 
the varying circumstances to which a general waiver of the duty of loyalty would apply. 
Furthermore, the beneficiaries would likely be unduly optimistic about the extent to which the 
manager would deal fairly despite the lack of fiduciary restraints. The availability and 
representativeness heuristics would enhance such undue optimism: Beneficiaries would tend 
to give undue weight to their good relationship with the manager at the time of contract 
formation, because that relationship is vivid, concrete, and instantiated, as compared with the 
possibility that the manager would exploit the bargain at some point in the future, which is 
abstract, general, and pallid, and would tend to overestimate the extent to which the present 
relationship with the manager is a reliable index of the future relationship. 
Id. at 249. 
204. This helps explain why, at early common law, self-interested transactions were voidable by 
shareholders. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of 
Directors' Self-Interested Transactions, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Summer 1999, at 243, 252-53 (noting 
that "any contract between a director and the corporation [was] voidable at the corporation's insistence" 
and noting that later, "courts may have believed that substantive judicial review [was] more likely to 
detect problematic transactions than [was] submission to shareholders"). 
205. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 104. 
206. See 188 AM. JuR. 2o Corporations §§ 1737-38 (2003) (providing a description of relevant 
statutory provisions and stating the rule under section 41 of the Model Business Corporation Act). 
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holder wealth.207 The law of most states also insulates an interested director 
from liability even if he has failed to obtain ex post authorization, provided he 
can show that the transaction was "fair" and/or in the corporation's best 
interests.208 In other words, a director is not liable for engaging in a transaction 
that fully informed shareholders would have agreed to ex ante. 
2. The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty 
a. Broad Waivers. Unlike corporate law, trust law allows a beneficiary to void 
a transaction when the trustee profits from engaging in a conflicted transaction 
with the trust without obtaining prior approval.209 The trustee is held per se 
liable simply upon the beneficiary's showing that the trustee had a personal 
interest in the transaction (the no-further-inquiry rule), even if the self-interested 
transaction caused the trust no damage.210 The trustee must disgorge all profits 
realized as a result of the transaction and return them to the trust. 
The rule sends a clear message to trustees: trustees must subordinate their 
interests to the trust's. If a trustee believes that a self-dealing transaction will 
benefit the trustee, it must obtain advance authorization from a court or the 
trust's beneficiaries.21I 
The duty of loyalty cannot be described purely as a default rule.2I2 Although 
parties may authorize particular acts that would otherwise be a breach of duty, 
they cannot agree to dispense with the duty of loyalty entirely. 213 As in the 
207. Melvin Eisenberg argues that a fairness test alone is insufficient to protect shareholder interests. 
Specifically, he argues that a "fairness" test should require that a transaction be both "fair" and "in the 
corporation's best interest." See Eisenberg, Divergence of Standards, supra note 5, at 450---51 (citing 
Am. Law Inst. , Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 5.02(a) (Pro-
posed Final Draft, 1992)). 
208. See MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 41 (Martindale-Hubbell Law Digest 1981) (providing that an 
interested transaction can be validated if it is "fair and reasonable to the corporation"); see also I SB 
AM. JuR. 2D Corporations § 1737 (2003) (noting that although some statutes recognize the validity of a 
board resolution approving a self-interested transaction, such transactions may be avoided if they are 
"unfair and unreasonable to the corporation"); 18B AM. JuR. 2D Corporations§ 1738 (2003) (citing the 
MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 41). 
209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTs § 78 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (stating that the 
"duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to the standards of other fiduciary 
relationships"). 
210. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTs § 78 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (stating that 
under the no-further-inquiry rule "it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the action in 
question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no profit resulted 
to the trustee"). ' 
211. As Cooter and Freedman note, "[t]he duty of loyalty must be understood as the law's attempt to 
create an incentive structure in which the fiduciary's self-interest directs her to act in the best interest of 
the beneficiary." Cooter & Freedman, supra note 163, at 1074. 
212. As the Restatement puts it, "to some extent the duty of loyalty involves (as do other duties) 
more than default law-that is, there are limits to the settlor's freedom, thereby protecting the 
fundamental fiduciary character of trust relationships recognized by law." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRusTs § 78 illus. c(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
213. Even the Uniform Trust Code does not permit an entire waiver of the duty of loyalty. Section 
105 provides that the only fiduciary provisions that are not waivable by the parties are the trustee's duty 
"to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes of the trust," and "the requirement that the 
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corporate context, no state authorizes, nor will any state court enforce, a trust 
term that insulates the trustee from liability for all self-dealing behavior. Given 
the almost total absence of market constraints (such as secondary information 
markets and institutional investors) on the trustee's opportunistic behavior, and 
the lack of unity between ownership and control (in contrast to the close 
corporation) the case for a mandatory rule is even stronger than in corporate 
law. And as difficult as the corporate director's opportunistic activity is to 
detect, the trustee's is often less visible to beneficiaries, who are relatively poor 
monitors.214 In addition, the trustee's breach has greater implications than in the 
corporate context: unlike the shareholder, who can sell her stock and cut her 
losses, the beneficiary (who often is dependent on the trust income for her 
livelihood) has no means of exit. These important differences between the 
corporate and trust contexts justify different decision rules. Unlike corporate 
law, a trustee who has engaged in a self-interested transaction with the trust 
cannot escape liability on a showing that the transaction was "fair." Instead, the 
trustee is strictly liable for breach of the duty of loyalty, and most trustees 
deliver all profits realized from the opportunistic transaction to the trust.215 This 
no-further-inquiry rule protects the beneficiary who cannot protect his or her 
self.216 It also sends a strong and unambiguous message to trustees: refrain from 
engaging in business with the trust. 
Broad provisions exculpating trustees for breach of the duty of loyalty are 
entirely inconsistent with the trust relationship the settlor has created. A broadly 
drafted exculpatory clause, if enforced, essentially gives the trustee the power to 
use the trust assets as her own. A fully informed settlor who wished to confer 
that power on a professional trustee would create no trust at all .2 17 
b. Limited, Specific Initial Waivers. As does corporate law, trust law recog-
nizes that occasional departures from the loyalty norm may be in the beneficia-
trust and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries." UNIF. TRusT CoDE § 105(b)(2)-(3) (2000). The 
exception to the rule that the parties cannot completely eliminate the duty of loyalty occurs when a 
settlor creates a revocable living trust to avoid probate. The settlor often names herself trustee and gives 
herself unlimited rights to the trust assets. Because revocable living trusts function only as substitutes 
for wills, they deserve different treatment and are not a subject of this Article. 
214. Beneficiaries often lack financial expertise or business savvy, and they may be minors. As a 
result, they sometimes place a high degree of trust in the trustee's superior knowledge. Beneficiaries, 
then, will often be unable to detect trustees' opportunistic behavior. 
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTs § 78 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (stating that 
under the no-further-inquiry rule "it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the action in 
question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no profit resulted 
to the trustee"). 
216. As Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman have put it, "[t]o overcome difficulties in proof, the 
law infers disloyalty from its appearance, presuming that a fiduciary will appropriate the principal's 
asset when it is in her self-interest to do so." Cooter & Freedman, supra note 163, at 1055. 
217. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 1121-22. For tax purposes, a settlor who wants to give a 
spouse full power to treat property as his own might nevertheless create a trust to take advantage of the 
settlor's unified credit under the federal estate tax, while naming the spouse-the person the settlor 
most trusts-as trustee. The same incentive would not exist, however, for a professional trustee. 
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ry's best interest.218 If so, then a court should uphold a trustee's interested 
transaction if the trust document specifically authorizes it, evidence shows that 
the settlor possessed complete information regarding the nature and future 
effect of the limited waiver, and the transaction at issue was one in which the 
settlor contemplated that the trustee would engage. 
Consider two examples of partial waivers. The first example involves a 
settlor who owns stock in the trust company that will serve as trustee. The 
settlor may wish to place the stock in trust, and if so will authorize the trustee to 
retain that investment. Or the settlor may create a credit shelter trust naming her 
husband both income beneficiary and trustee, with a limited right to invade the 
principal for his own benefit (and without regard for the remainder beneficia-
ries' preferences). Both waivers should be enforceable. In neither situation does 
the asymmetrical information problem exist. The purpose of the authorization is 
clear, and allowing the trustee to make choices that benefit her is consistent with 
the settlor' s purpose. 
When the settlor does not derive such a clear-cut benefit from an authoriza-
tion of trustee self-dealing, courts have been extraordinarily reluctant to shield 
institutional trustees from liability. Courts' grudging approach may reveal both 
an inherent understanding of the asymmetrical information and foresight prob-
lems, and a desire to prevent the erosion of normative force of the loyalty 
standard. 
Consider In re Anneke,219 in which the settlor, who was represented by 
counsel, executed a trust document to benefit his daughter. The document, 
drafted by the trustee's counsel, contained a number of provisions arguably 
designed to allow the institutional trustee to purchase for the trust bonds and 
other securities offered by its bond department. 220 The relevant trust provisions 
gave the trustees "absolute and uncontrolled discretion" to choose invest-
ments, 221 authorized the trustee to make illegal investments as long as the 
trustee judged those investments to be in the trust's best interests, and in a 
paragraph titled, "Transactions With Bond Department of Trustee," provided 
that the trustee "in the case of an investment . .. in securities held by it, shall be 
entitled to the regular commission or underwriting profits of its Bond Depart-
ment on the sale of such securities, in addition to the [trustee's fee] herein 
provided .... "222 The trust document also exculpated the trustee from liability 
218. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ThusTs § 78 cmt. c(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (stating that "a 
trustee may be authorized by the terms of the trust, expressly or by implication, to engage in 
transactions that would otherwise be prohibited by the rules of undivided loyalty," but emphasizing that 
even when the settlor has authorized such transactions, "no matter how broad the provisions of a trust 
may be in conferring power to engage in self-dealing or other transactions involving a conflict of 
fiduciary and personal interests, a trustee violates the duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries by acting in 
bad faith or unfairly"). 
219. 38 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 1949). 
220. Id. at 178. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
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for loss incurred by reason of the trustee's good faith mistakes or errors in 
judgment and for loss incurred as a result of any action taken at the settlor's 
direction.223 In following years, the trustee purchased many investments from 
its own bond department, often with the settlor's agent's approval. The trustee 
purchased bonds at slightly below par and sold them to the trust at par, and it 
furnished the settlor with semi-annual reports revealing the nature of the trust 
investments. This pattern continued after the settlor's death-for more than 
twenty years. In 1948, some twenty-two years after the trust was created, the 
beneficiaries objected to the trustee's yearly accounting on the grounds of 
self-dealing.224 The trial court surcharged the trustee for losses incurred on the 
investments, 225 and the Minnesota Supreme Court sustained the trial court. 226 
In upholding the trustee's liability, the court focused on the prohibition 
against a trustee purchasing its own investment vehicles for the trust. The court 
then stated, 
applying this rule to the facts and circumstances presented here will not 
permit us to read into the instrument, by implication, a waiver of a rule of law 
so well-established and so strictly applied as that against self-dealing by a 
fiduciary .... [H]ad [trustees's counsel] intended to grant to the trustee author-
ity to deal in securities owned by it for the trust in contravention of the well 
established and strict rule against self-dealing, it would have been a simple 
matter for him to say so in clear and unmistakable language. 227 
The court also rejected the trustee's argument that the settlor had acquiesced 
in the investments on the ground that none of the trustee's communications 
clearly revealed that the investments, while offered by a separate corporation 
with a different name, were essentially owned by the trustee.228 
Anneke involved clear information asymmetries. The trustee's counsel drafted 
the language. One could infer that the settlor's attorney failed to negotiate or 
challenge the trust company over those terms. Moreover, the trust company 
failed to explain clearly to the settlor that the differently named corporation 
from which it was purchasing investments was affiliated with the trustee. 
The Anneke court also took the opportunity to reinforce the norms of fidu-
ciary behavior. The court emphasized the importance of the traditional duty-of-
loyalty rules.229 In insisting that the trustee's breach amounted to a moral 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 179. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 183. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 179 (declaring that "the rule against self-dealing by a trustee, which prohibits both sale of 
the trustee's own property to the trust and purchase by the trustee of property of the trust, is so firmly 
established and universally accepted that it seems useless to again restate the rule here"); id. at 181 
(quoting Scorr, supra note 25, at 538, the Anneke court emphasized that, "[t]he principle that a trustee 
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failing, the court reinforced the norm to ensure that fewer trustees would err on 
the side of self-dealing. 
3. The Duty of Loyalty Under Assault 
Terminology matters. Characterizing fiduciary duties as default rules ignores 
their important norm-enforcing function. If the view of fiduciary duties as 
optional default terms becomes entrenched, then the default terms themselves 
are vulnerable to attack by banks and others who seek to limit trustee liability. If 
fiduciary duties have no moral or normative content, then why not change the 
default rules? After all, the parties to the trust document can always draft around 
them. 
In fact, default rule rhetoric has exposed the duty of loyalty to this type of 
attack. As a result, the past fifteen years has seen the duty weakened in 
significant ways. The attack has come not from the judiciary, but on the 
legislative front. First, over the past fifteen years, the majority of states have 
enacted statutes providing that trustee investments in vehicles owned by the 
trustee or a related company do not give rise to a breach of the duty of loyalty. 
The justification for these statutes is that they are necessary to enable trustees to 
invest trust assets in mutual funds, and that allowing self-interested investing 
will create economies of scale that will benefit all trusts. The justification, 
however, does not explain why it is necessary to allow the trustee's related or 
parent company to collect both trustee commissions and fees in its capacity as 
an investment bank. Recognizing this, some state legislatures require trustees 
who invest in their own investment vehicles to choose between earning trustee 
commissions or investment commissions.230 Other states, while allowing trust-
ees to earn double commissions, at least require trustees to notify the beneficia-
ries that they are profiting from their trustee position, which mitigates the 
monitoring problem somewhat.231 The majority of states, however, provide no 
protections for beneficiaries, and simply authorize institutional trustees to profit 
cannot [properly] sell his individual property to the trust is applicable to corporate trustees. A trust 
company violates its duty to the beneficiaries of a trust under which it is trustee if it purchases property 
from itself'). 
230. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7-408 (West 1998); N.Y. EsT. PowERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 11-2.2 
(Consol. 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.55 (West 2004). Nebraska goes further, requiring the 
trustee to obtain the beneficiary 's consent to self-dealing in writing. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-3205 
(2004). 
231. ALA. CODE§ 19-3-120.1 (1997); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 6-246 (Supp. 2004); CONN . GEN. STAT. 
§ 45a-209 (2003); DEL CoDE ANN. tit. 12, § 3312 (2004); FLA. STAT.§ 660.417 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN § 9:2127 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167G, § 3 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); MINN. 
STAT. § 501B.151 (2002); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 81-5-33 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 32-1-420 (2003); 
NEB. REV. STAT.§ 30-3205 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 662.097, 669.225 (2003); N.M. STAT.§ 46-2A-1 
(2003); N.C . G EN. STAT. § 36A-66.2 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 6-03-02 (1987 & Supp. 2003); OHIO 
REv. CODE ANN.§ 1109.10 (West 2003); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 7314.1 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws 
§ 55-1 A-9 (2001); Tux. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.053 (Vernon 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-44.1 (2004); 
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 2-3-301 (2005). 
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from their position as trustees, 232 a result once clearly prohibited by the duty of 
loyalty.233 As a result, settlors who wish to prohibit certain types of trustee 
self-dealing must expressly contract for that protection.234 
Although one might not expect legislators to appreciate the negative externali-
ties that such a move might generate, it is quite troubling that academics have 
failed to spot the problem. Instead, some have joined in the effort to weaken the 
constraints that the duty places on trustees. The Uniform Trust Code, which 
freely uses "default rule" rhetoric, not only follows the ill-advised state law 
trend toward authorizing an entire class of self-dealing investments,235 but does 
232. The following statutes authorize trustees to invest in mutual funds or other investments from 
which they will earn additional commissions or fees: ALASKA STAT. § 13.90.010 (2004); ARK. CooE 
ANN. § 28-71-104 (2004); CAL. PRos. CooE § 16015 (West 2002); GA. CooE ANN. § 53-8-2 (1997); 
HAw. REv. STAT. § 412:8-400 (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-404A (2004); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5.2 
(2004); IND. CooE § 28-1-12-3 (1998); lowA CODE 633 .123A (2004); Kv. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 386.020 
(West 2004); Mo. CooE ANN., EsT. & TRusTs § 15-106 (LexisNexis 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
487.485 (West 1998); Mo. REv. STAT.§ 362.550 (2000); OR. REv. STAT. § 709.175 (2003); S.C. CooE 
ANN. § 62-7-302 (West Supp. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-3-117 (2001); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 75-7-402 
(1993); WASH. REV. CooE § 11.100.035 (2004); W. VA. CooE ANN. § 44-6-9 (LexisNexis 2004); Wis. 
STAT. § 881.01 (2003-2004). 
233. Although paper trails are few, the available evidence (not to mention common sense) suggests 
that the banking lobby pushed for this legislation. For example, the history of the New York legislation 
that authorizes trustees to invest in proprietary mutual funds reveals that the New York State Bankers 
Association lobbied for the legislation, arguing that the measure was necessary to enable them to 
compete for business with banks in other states. See Letter to The Honorable Elizabeth D. Moore, 
Counsel to the Governor, from the New York State Bankers Association (July 16, 1992) (on file at the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York). Although government actors responding to the 
governor's request for advice concluded that the bill was "inadvisable" because it could "erode the 
historic rules in New York which prohibit a trustee from engaging in self-dealing or from taking other 
positions where his personal interest might be in conflict with his duty as a trustee," the bill passed. See 
Letter to Governor Mario Cuomo from James W. Wetzler, Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, 
dated July 17, 1992 (on file with the library of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). The 
Assembly Rules Committee Memorandum argues that the legislation was necessary to compete with 
other states. See Memorandum of the Assembly Rules Committee: Fiduciary/Investment Mutual Funds 
(New York State Assembly, Assembly Bill No. 11971, June I 0, 1992). 
234. In the most recent draft of the Restatement (Third), the drafters take note of this state statutory 
development and characterize it as an "exception" to the duty of loyalty. They do not appear to endorse 
these statutes, however. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTS § 78 cmt. c(8) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
2005) (noting that the UTC comments purporting to justify the exception merely describe the advan-
tages of mutual funds, but do not explain why investments in proprietary mutual funds are necessary); 
id. cmt. c (describing the proprietary mutual fund exception as "an exception that has been adopted by 
(and is dependent upon) legislation enacted in most American jurisdictions" (emphasis added)). 
235. UTC § 802(f) provides: 
An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or investment trust to 
which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity other than as trustee is not 
presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if the invest-
ment complies with the prudent investor rule of [Article] 9. In addition to its compensation for 
acting as trustee, the trustee may be compensated by the investment company or investment 
trust for providing those services out of fees charged to the trust if the trustee at least annually 
notifies the persons entitled under section 813 to receive a copy of the trustee's annual report 
of the rate and method by which the compensation was determined. 
UN1F. TRusT CODE § 802(f) (2000). 
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so without requiring trustees to choose between trustee or investment commis-
sions. 236 It also authorizes a second broad classification of transactions that the 
law formerly prohibited. Section 802(c)(4) transforms from self-dealing to 
indirect self-dealing all transactions between institutional and professional trust-
ees and companies related to them or in which they have an interest.237 If 
adopted, this change will free institutional trustees from the constraints of the 
no-further-inquiry rule and allow them to profit from a wide variety of formerly 
prohibited transactions as long as trustees can argue that "the transaction was 
not affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests. "238 This 
marked departure from trust law's no-further-inquiry rule requires a settlor who 
wishes to prevent this type of self-dealing to bargain for the protection that the 
law historically has provided. 
The movement to dilute the duty of loyalty has reached an apex with a newly 
published article by John Langbein, who now advocates replacing the no-further-
inquiry rule with a default rule that would allow trustees to engage in self-
interested transactions. 239 Professor Langbein argues that the time has come to 
replace the duty of loyalty's no-further-inquiry rule, which flatly prohibits the 
trustee from gaining personal advantage from its position, with a "fairness" test 
that would allow a trustee to profit from a transaction with the trust so long as 
the trustee could prove, if challenged, that the transaction was in the trust's best 
236. The Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Trusts does not seem to embrace the state law 
trend toward allowing trustee double-dipping. In the most recent draft of the Restatement (Third), the 
drafters take note of these state statutes and characterize them as "exceptions" to the duty of loyalty. 
The Reporter fails to endorse them, however. See supra note 234. 
237. Section 802(c) provides: 
(c) A sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of 
trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary 
interests if it is entered into by the trustee with: 
(I) the trustee's spouse; 
(2) the trustee's descendants, siblings, parents, or their spouses; 
(3) an agent or attorney of the trustee; or 
(4) a corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee, or a person that 
owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee's 
best judgment. 
UNIF. TRusT CODE § 802(c) (2000) (emphasis added). 
238. The relevant comments in full provide: 
The rule is less severe with respect to transactions involving trust property entered into with 
persons who have close business or personal ties with the trustee. Under subsection (c), a 
transaction between a trustee and certain relatives and business associates is presumptively 
voidable, not void. Also presumptively voidable are transactions with corporations or other 
enterprises in which the trustee, or a person who owns a significant interest in the trustee, has 
an interest that might affect the trustee's best judgment. The presumption is rebutted if the 
trustee establishes that the transaction was not affected by a conflict between personal and 
fiduciary interests. Among the factors tending to rebut the presumption are whether the 
consideration was fair and whether the other terms of the transaction are similar to those that 
would be transacted with an independent party. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (2000). 
239. Langbein, supra note 23, at 932. 
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interests.24° Characterizing the trust as a "contract" and the duty of loyalty as a 
"default rule" causes Langbein to give inadequate consideration to the trust's 
unique features, including information asymmetries, foresight problems, and, 
most importantly, the law's function of enforcing loyalty norms.241 As a result, 
his proposal threatens to erode the duty of loyalty's proscriptive power-to the 
detriment of all trust beneficiaries. 
CONCLUSION 
The move to reconceptualize fiduciary duties as simple default rules, di-
vorced of any normative content, is likely to have serious consequences for 
many trust settlors and beneficiaries. Courts should enforce waivers of fiduciary 
duties only when there is clear evidence (such as pricing or transaction-
specificity) that the settlor possessed full information. This approach will 
support and strengthen the social norm of trust that facilitates efficient transact-
ing in the trust setting. 
To the extent the UTC encourages courts to enforce all exculpatory clauses 
absent evidence of coercion, it threatens to erode the important role that the 
judiciary has played in effectuating settlors' intentions and minimizing transac-
tion costs. This Article suggests that the UTC is seriously flawed, because it 
overlooks monitoring problems that are unique to the trust context when it 
allows institutional trustees largely to escape the no-further-inquiry rule. States 
that are considering adopting the UTC would do well to pay careful attention to 
its duty-of-loyalty provisions. 
240. Id. 
241. Professor Langbein 's principal objection to the no-further-inquiry rule is that it overdeters 
trustees and discourages them from making investments that would benefit the trust beneficiaries. 
Professor Langbein's argument fails to persuade, because he minimizes the importance of the advance-
approval doctrine, which allows trustees to profit, provided that they obtain advance approval from the 
court or the trust beneficiaries. He does not and cannot establish that the no-further-inquiry rule 
overdeters to any significant degree. Professor Langbein fails to examine the significant costs that his 
own proposal would create by underdeterring trustee opportunism. A comparison of the no-further-
inquiry rule with Professor Langbein's best-interest defense shows that his proposal would be more 
harmful to trust beneficiaries as a class. See Leslie, supra note 23. 
